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Towards a Right of Biography:
Controlling Commercial Exploitation of Personal
History
By ERIK D. LAZAR*
Introduction
The recognition of rights in personality has been one of the
hallmarks of tort law in this century. Though the scope of defa-
mation has narrowed with Constitutional rulings protecting
publishers from liability for negligent misstatements in certain
circumstances,' other doctrines have expanded to provide
stronger shields against unwarranted intrusion and exploita-
tion? Since its inception in Samuel Warren's and Louis Bran-
deis's famous article,3 the law of privacy has developed to
encompass four separate torts: intrusion into seclusion, public
disclosure of embarrassing secrets, false light publicity, and
misappropriation of name or likeness.4 In more recent times,
* Member, Class of 1980.
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1. The tort of defamation involves communication to another that invades an in-
terest in good name or reputation. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 737-
801 (4th ed. 1971). Since this note primarily explores the protection of other interests in
personality, concepts of defamation law will be discussed only where pertinent. For a
recent overview, see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975). The Consti-
tutional privilege, requiring a showing of knowing or reckless disregard of the truth in
defamation suits, originally applied only to official conduct of public officials. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). A period of expanding scope
followed, however, to the point where the privilege was imposed in suits by public
figures and those involved in matters of public interest. See Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
2. The Supreme Court has recdntly narrowed the privilege. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (allowing states to formulate less stringent rules for
suits by purely private citizens); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1975) (formulat-
ing a strict test to determine who constitutes a public figure).
3. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). According
to one author, the excesses of Boston society columnists spurred the two lawyers to
create a separate recognition for an interest in seclusion. See MASON, BRANDEIs, A
FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946).
4. The law of privacy received its most comprehensive modern analysis in Pros-
ser, Privacy, 48 CA. L REV. 383 (1960). Prosser's breakdown of the cases into the four
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the right of publicity, first recognized in 1953, has moved to pro-
tect economic interests in personality distinct from the realm
of personal feelings.
The field where the limits of personality rights are most se-
verely tested is entertainment, where there has been a marked
tendency to embellish real incidents or personal histories for
purposes of docu-dramas and historical fiction.6 This deliber-
ate blending of fact and fancy-fictionalization 7-theoretically
invades many of the interests that the privacy and publicity
doctrines, in their broad terms, were created to protect.' Dis-
categories has been invaluable for distinguishing the varied interests. Intrusion cases
focus on physical invasion akin to nuisance or trespass. Id. at 392. The original con-
cept is embodied in the public disclosure category, which guards reputational values.
Id. at 392, 298. False light actions extend remedies to areas where disclosure may
cause damage to aspects of the personality other than good name. Id. at 400. Although
misappropriation of name or likeness was not originally included, courts have recog-
nized that such exploitation may invade both personal and proprietary interests. Id. at
406.
For other perspectives on the development of privacy law, see Bloustein, Privacy as
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964);
Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Wanat, Falsehoods, the Right of
Privacy and the Constitutional Privilege: Time, Inc. v. Hill Revisited, 8 MEM. ST. L.
REV. 33 (1976).
5. The right of publicity recognizes an impersonal economic interest in the ex-
ploitation of name or likeness. Traditionally it has been applied where a name or pho-
tograph has been appropriated without consent for advertising or in connection with a
commercial product. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 203 (1954); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal
Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637 (1973). For special aspects of the right, see Comment,
Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103 (1975); Pilpel & Schwartz, Mickey Mouse, Dracula, and the Rights
of Parody and Privacy, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Sept. 16, 1974, at 32; Rudell, Right of Pub-
licity-Descendability, 1978 NEW YORK LAw JOURNAL 1. See notes 178-203 and accom-
panying text, infra.
6. Popularity of these works has not stemmed a significant rise in criticism con-
cerning the excesses and dangers posed by films and books which take liberties with
the personal details and historical truths. See generally Lukas, Bullets For Breslin,
MORE, June, 1978, at 32 (critique of novel based on "Son of Sam" murders); Griffith,
Playing With the Facts, TIME, Sept. 19, 1977, at 92; Scandal As Entertainment, TIME,
Sept. 19, 1977, at 92; Maddocks, Now for the Age of Psst!, TIME, June 28, 1976, at 68;
Rembar, Turning You Into Movies, ESQUIRE, April, 1977, at 75. See also Woodward,
History's 50-Minute Hour, NEWSWEEK, April 18, 1977, at 96 (psychobiographies); Fried-
man, "Don't dare put me in your play," THE WRITER, June, 1969, at 16.
7. The term "fictionalization" throughout this note will mean the act of making
into fiction or treating in the manner of fiction. Fiction is defined as the act of creating
something imaginary: a fabrication of the mind. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DicTIoN-
ARY 844 (14th ed. 1961).
8. See generally PILPEL & ZAVIN, RIGHTS AND WRITERS (1960).
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tortion through fiction, purportedly done for artistic effect,' can
result, if not in reputational harm, in deep embarrassment or
ridicule.10 Under a cloak of altered names or circumstances a
skillful roman A clefu may reveal personal idiosyncracies or
secrets.12 Moreover, by preempting the market with a success-
ful production, a book or film can diminish an individual's op-
portunity to sell his story to writers or producers, thus
depriving him of a tangible economic benefit.13 These concerns
are relevant to both the living and their survivors, for a work
that capitalizes on another's career may well reflect not only on
his family but also on his intimate associates, whose interest in
his portrayal will surely outlive him."
Despite their evident applicability to fictionalized biogra-
phies, judicial treatment under the privacy and publicity theo-
ries has been far from consistent. More than one commentator
has called the present state of the law a "schizophrenia,"s
9. For an examination of the importance of hyperbole, dramatic license and crea-
tive expression, see Schauer, Language, Truth, and The First Amendment: An Essay in
Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263 (1978); Silver, Privacy and the First
Amendment, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1966) and Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and
the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (1978).
10. Protection against reputational harm, and, in some instances, ridicule, are
traditional provinces of defamation law. Actions have also been waged under privacy
concepts for similar harm to personal feelings caused by fictionalization. See, e.g.,
Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953); Spahn v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967); appeal dismissed,
393 U.S. 1046 (1969); Goldberg v. Ideal Publ. Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
Youssoupoff v. CBS, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd mem., 10
A.D.2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't. 1963). See notes 59-71 and accompanying text,
infra.
11. A roman A clef is a novel in which real persons or actual events figure under
disguise. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1969 (14th ed. 1961).
12. Movies as well as books largely based on real characters have been the subject
of much litigation. See, e.g., Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 58 A.D.2d 45, 395 N.Y.S.2d
205 (1977) (stemming from the film, Dog Day Afternoon); Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948) (They Were Expendable); Wheeler v. Dell Publ. Co., 300 F.2d
372 (7th Cir. 1962) (Anatomy of a Murder); Leopold v. Levin, 45 111. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d
250 (1970) (Compulsion). See also Bernstein v. NBC, 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955)
(television program).
13. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Wilson, 2 MED. L. RprR. 2008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Marvin Worth
Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
14. Privacy actions brought by friends and relatives of the central character, how-
ever, have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345
F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799
(1959); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177 (Utah 1953). But
see Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1953).
15. Gordon, The Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55
N.W. L. REv. 553, 590 (1960). The term "schizophrenia" was used to describe the failure
of courts to distinguish between property and personal interests in suits under the
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crippling in its uncertainties to both the writer and his subject.
Some courts have not allowed recovery for fictionalization
unless the nature of the work was found so distorted or intru-
sive as to be shocking to the conscience." Others, applying
strict privacy rules, have found that with regard to portrayals
of public figures, the public interest was more important than
any potential or actual invasion of the personality. 7 In New
York, working under a unique statutory scheme, the courts
have accomplished a remarkable feat in giving the individual a
measure of control over the presentation of his image while al-
lowing some degree of latitude for inaccuracies. California
courts have recently confronted the problem of whether recog-
nition of property rights in personal history would create an
undue burden on the arts by encouraging suits by heirs to
whom these rights would descend."
Whether the law will reach a new synthesis in this turmoil
misappropriation branch of privacy. Since commercialized biographies clearly involve
both interests, the phrase is equally applicable.
16. The requirement that a disclosure or intrusion be highly offensive or "shock-
ing" stems from the rules of privacy law. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B, Comment d; § 652D, Comment c, Illustrations 8-11 (1976). Note particu-
larly that the Restatement addresses itself to factual disclosures alone with respect to
intrusion upon seclusion and publicizing private facts. Defamation, which involves a
harm to reputation through injurious falsehood, has no such requirement. Fictional
disclosures in these categories may be defamatory, yet not invade privacy. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564, Comment d (1976). Recent privacy cases include
O'Hilderbrandt v. CBS, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 323, 114 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1974); Virgil v.
Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976). See also notes 134-42 infra. The
"shocking" requirement may also be imposed in false light privacy actions, which are
closely akin to defamation. Constitutional safeguards also limit these actions by re-
quiring actual malice in certain situations. Thus even a major misrepresentation of
character, history, activities or belief may escape liability unless found to be highly
offensive. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652E, Comment c, Illustrations 6-9,
Comment d (1971).
17. Weighing of public interest is integral to determining the viability of a privacy
action. Generally even highly offensive publications are permissible if a subject of le-
gitimate public concern. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment d,
Illustrations 12, Comment 3, Comment f (1971); Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975). For the classic "public interest" case, see Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1940) (expos6 of the post-limelight life of a former child prodigy). Note,
however, that these formulations are related to substantially factual publications.
Whether public interest is served by blatantly distorted material is another issue en-
tirely. See cases cited in note 74, infra.
18. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) is
the most recent case, resulting in a dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint. Actions
pending at the time of this note include Gable v. Music Corp. of America, Civ. No.
NCC12908B (Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., filed 1976); Bruce v. United Artists, Civ. No.
C140943 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., filed 1976).
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and recognize in effect what would be the right to control com-
mercial exploitation of biography is of vast importance to writ-
ers, producers, and countless notable figures as well. It is here
submitted that at least with respect to the utilization of actual
names and histories in fictionalized dramas, there is a sound
basis for the right.19 In order to determine the proper scope
and purpose of the right, it is necessary to examine the theo-
ries now operating that grant some degree of control over per-
sonal histories and to dispense with several artificial concepts
that still linger. Three distinct doctrines will be reviewed: the
hybrid approach under the New York privacy statute, which
implicitly acknowledges an economic as well as a personal in-
terest in biography which has been exploited through fictional-
ization; a strict privacy interpretation as exemplified by a
series of California cases; and the relatively new theory, scruti-
nized by New York and California courts, that additional con-
trol over exploitation of personality can best be achieved
through application of property concepts to fictionalized biog-
raphies.2 0 Through comparison of cases in. each area, it will be-
come evident that a fresh, innovative outlook is needed to
dissipate the judicial conflicts and confusion now reigning.
The New York Privacy Statute
The process of establishing a degree of control over exploita-
tion of personal history under New York law is like fitting a
square peg in a round hole. Faced with an early rejection of
the broad common law right of privacy, courts wishing to fash-
ion a remedy for fictionalization have found themselves con-
fined to a narrowly drawn statute.2 ' The letter of the statute
19. Most of the litigation over use of personal traits and history with little if any
reference to a real name has been unsuccessful. See cases cited in note 12, supra.
Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948) is a notable exception. The prob-
lem for litigants has been the obvious reluctance of courts to accept a character as
identifiable, even when strong evidence points in that direction. See, e.g., Mid-
dlebrooks v. Curtis Publ. Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969). As a result of this attitude,
the courts downplay, if not ignore, the rule that in both privacy and defamation ac-
tions, use of name is not necessary if identification is reasonable. Compare RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A; Comments a, b, d (1976) with id. § 564.
20. The first extensive exposition of a property approach to biography was in
Gordon, supra note 15. See also Treece, supra note 5; Donenfeld, Property or Other
Rights in the Names, Likenesses, or Personalities of Deceased Persons, 16 COPYRIGHT
BuLL. 17 (1968); Comment, Why Not a Relational Right of Privacy?-Or Right of Prop-
erty?, 42 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 175 (1973).
21. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976).
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refers to commercial appropriation, and it is designed to pro-
tect certain pecuniary interests of the person being exploited.
In this it resembles the right of publicity which developed
much later as a pure property right in name and likeness. 22
The spirit of the law, however, derives from a desire to protect
personal feelings from unwarranted invasions, stemming from
the common law right of privacy. In applying the statute to
fictionalized biographies, which involve an invasion of both
personal and economic interests, the courts have stretched the
language of the statute to bring these works under the neces-
sary labels, while limiting actions through the application of
several common law concepts. The most important has been
the idea that a personal interest, though it may also be eco-
nomic, must give way in the face of a valid need for publication
of the work. The result has been the development of a hybrid
action, which recognizes the right to damages for personal
harm suffered by the misappropriation, yet denies recovery
when the public's interest in the dissemination of the work is
deemed paramount.
The flexibility inherent in this approach is evident from its
beginnings in the dissent from a 1902 New York Court of Ap-
peals decision, Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co." When
the majority denied a remedy to a young woman whose picture
was used without her consent to advertise flour, Justice Gray
in his well-noted minority opinion proposed that the law estab-
lish a new doctrine that would both recognize a property inter-
est in name and likeness and guard against such unwarranted
intrusions into personal privacy.24 Disturbed by the majority
holding,2 5 the state legislature promptly heeded the suggestion
and enacted at the next session a statute which has remained
unchanged to this day.26 Entitled "The Right of Privacy," it
provides for civil and criminal sanctions against one who with-
out authorization uses a person's name, portrait, or picture for
22. See notes 178-203 and accompanying text, infra.
23. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
24. The property aspect of the plaintiffs interest was stressed: "I think that this
plaintiff has the same property in the right to be protected against the use of her face
for defendant's commercial purposes, as she would have, if they were publishing her
literary compositions." Id. at 564, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
25. Prosser, supra note 4, at 385.
26. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132.
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advertising or for purposes of trade.2 7 Courts were given the
power to enforce the statute through injunctions and other ap-
propriate measures. 28 The statute was designed to be, and has
remained, the only possible source for an "invasion of privacy"
claim in the jurisdiction, but its character was markedly differ-
ent from the common law right.2 9
Ostensibly, the legislation provided protection only against
the form of exploitation present in Roberson, where an aspect
of personality was appropriated to further the commercial ad-
vertising interests of the defendant.ao In this respect the New
York statute is almost identical to the safeguards under the
"misappropriation" wing of common law privacy, which
awards damages for use in advertising based on injury to per-
sonal feelings. The New York courts, however, were not in-
clined to construe narrowly what was essentially a remedial
measure, since many justices saw laws of this kind as poten-
tially broad measures to correct omissions of earlier archaic in-
terpretations.3 1 As one eminent observer commented, the
statute should be treated as "a guest to be welcomed and made
at home . . . as a new and powerful aid in . . . accomodating
27. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 1976). The term "privacy" was used only
for the criminal section of the law:
A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or of a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
28. The civil section of the law sets out the available remedies:
Action for injunction and for damages-Any person whose name, portrait or
picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided may main-
tain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person,
firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and re-
strain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly
used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages.
Id. § 51 (McKinney 1976).
29. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld early on in the limited context
of photographs. See Rhoades v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097
(1908), affd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911). For a recent critique, see Greenwalt, New York's Right
of Privacy-The Need for Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 159 (1975).
30. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 731 (1937).
31. See discussion in Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
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the law to social needs."3 2 Judicial expansion of the New York
statute beyond the confines of the letter of the law soon fol-
lowed its enactment.
The issue of whether a certain appropriation was for "pur-
poses of trade" produced some major innovations in the case
law.3 3 Most critical was the early recognition that despite the
degree of public interest they involved, certain forms of com-
munication could indeed invade an interest in personality by
commercializing a portion or the entirety of an individual's life
story.' Fictionalization was the method through which biogra-
phy, otherwise protectible as a form of news dissemination,
could be transformed into a trade product for purposes of the
statute.
Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America3 5 is the seminal
case propounding the theory that a certain degree of fictional-
ization may amount to an appropriation for commercial or, in
the terms of the New York statute, "trade" use. The key was
the court's perception that embellishment36 is clearly intended
to enhance the value of the product for sale. John Binns, a
wireless operator who had been involved in the first rescue at
sea through the use of the telegraph, sued over a filmed reen-
actment of the heroic effort which employed actors and a
32. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1936).
33. In order to prevent encroachment by the statute on press freedom, the courts
made an early distinction between communications which were published primarily
for profit and those motivated more by news purposes. Thus, the mere fact that a book
or newspaper was sold for gain did not bring the item under the "trade purpose" ru-
bric. See, e.g., Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Publ. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y.S.
780 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publ. Co., 162 A.D. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999
(1941); Wallach v. Bacharach, 192 Misc. 979, 80 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Although
the goal of such cases was implicitly to protect access to matters of public interest, in
accord with traditional privacy concepts, the statute made the test the extent of com-
mercialization. For cases upholding appropriation in other jurisdictions on the basis of
newsworthiness, see Gordon, supra note 15, at 572, 573. See also Cordell v. Detective
Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Jenkins v. Dell Publ. Co., 251
F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958).
34. The courts recognized that an actionable appropriation would have to make
use of name and history. Thus, incidental mention of a name in a novel or a brief shot
of a real person in a film would not be actionable. See Damron v. Doubleday, Doran &
Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N.Y.S. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1928). The problem is akin to imposing liabil-
ity in defamation for an arbitrarily chosen name. See cases cited at note 19, supra.
35. 147 A.D. 783, 132 N.Y.S. 237 (1911), affd, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
36. The term "embellishment" throughout this note refers to a lesser yet still cog-
nizable degree of fictionalization. In general, courts have used the term interchangea-
bly with "fictionalization" to describe distortion of reality through use of the
imagination. Thus, in this note "highly embellished" is synonymous with such terms
as "major fictionalization."
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purely fictional script. Binns, an Englishman, was particularly
incensed by the film's ending, where his counterpart was
shown gawking into the camera under the subheading, "Jack
Binns and his Good American Smile."37
Binns argued, and the Appellate Division of the state
Supreme Court agreed, that although the rescue was a matter
of great public concern, the defendant could not rely on the de-
fense of newsworthiness if he had in fact distorted the true
story to enhance its potential marketability. The court noted
that although the plaintiff could not prevent a reasonable fac-
tual account of the incident from being aired, he had every
right to enjoin a fictionalized treatment clearly designed for
selfish, commercial purposes.38 "If the use of the plaintiff's
name and picture as shown in this case is not within the terms
of the statute," the court concluded, "then the picture of any
individual can be similarly made and exhibited for the purpose
of showing his peculiarities as of dress and walk, and his per-
sonal fads, eccentricities, amusements, and even his private
life. By such pictures an audience would be amused and the
makers of films and exhibitors would be greatly enriched. The
greater the exaggeration . .. the greater the profit."39 The test
thus established hinged on the amount and degree of fictional
distortion. A news event presented with minor inaccuracies
could not have been actionable under the statute. However,
major fictionalization would result in liability.' The court also
indicated that liability would accrue even if the party was not
named in the work but the presentation of the character was
sufficiently accurate so as to identify him to the public."1 This
in effect established a second test-whether the plaintiff was
reasonably identifiable.
37. 210 N.Y. at 53, 103 N.E. at 1109.
38. Id. at 57, 103 N.E. at 1110.
39. Id. at 58, 103 N.E. at 1111.
40. Although it refused to define the limits of non-actionable fictionalization, the
court suggested strongly that any re-creation of a newsworthy event which employed a
script and actors, as opposed to a documentary rendition, might fall under the statute:
"In the case now before us, the series of pictures were not the pictures of a current
event, but mainly a product of the imagination, based, however, largely upon such in-
formation relating to the actual occurrence as could be readily obtained." Id. at 56, 103
N.E. at 1110.
41. "A picture within the meaning of the statute is not necessarily a photograph of
the living person, but includes any representation of such person." Id. at 57, 103 N.E. at
1110 (emphasis added). Later courts, noting the plaintiffs real name had been used,
glossed over this passage in interpreting the statute to require a full name. See cases
cited in note 50, infra.
No. 3]1 497
COMM/ENT
Both these distinctions-between fact and fiction and be-
tween suggestion and identification-played an important role
in the development of the Binns theory, necessitating constant
reinterpretation. In effect, application of the tests made action-
able fictionalization a matter of degree. Obviously, substantial
fictionalization was required to transform the work in question
to a trade product. But if the novel or screenplay was too
fictionalized, to the extent that the plaintiff was not identifiable
or bore no real relation to the character, it could not be consid-
ered a form of commercial exploitation. Instead it would be
protected as itself, a work of "pure" fiction, divorced entirely
from the concerns of any real person who might imagine him-
self as portrayed in the work. Early cases exemplified the un-
certainty through inconsistent application of these concepts.
For instance, courts denied recovery where the plaintiffs name
was used once in a 400 page novel' and where from the total
presentation it appeared a reenactment was accurate;43 never-
theless, a plaintiff could recover when his image was unneces-
sarily interjected into an entertainment film." At the same
time, it should be noted, New York courts indicated a willing-
ness to prevent similar exploitation in the area of defamation,
holding several movie producers and novelists liable for derog-
atory portrayals of living persons in their works.45 Decisions in
42. Darnron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N.Y.S. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
In view of the fact that the plaintiffs suit was predicated on privacy, not defamation,
the court did not hesitate in finding the intrusion to be de minimis. Nevertheless, the
court noted, "literary expediency may not be advanced as an excuse for violating the
statute." Id. at 303, 231 N.Y.S. at 446.
43. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 467, 178 N.Y.S. 752 (1919). The
case, involving a newsreel, clarified the difference between actionable and non-action-
able film presentations: "There is a clear distinction between a newsreel and a motion
picture photoplay. A photoplay is inherently a work offiction. A newsreel contains no
fiction, but shows only actual photographs of current events of public interest." Id. at
470, 178 N.Y.S. at 755 (emphasis added). "In the Binns case . .. the presentation was
not of pictures actually taken at the time of the occurrence of the events but the film
was taken in a studio, with actors dressed for the occasion, in order to present a repre-
sentation of what might have occurred. It was held to be pure fiction, and not fact, and
as such was held to be within the act." Id. at 475, 178 N.Y.S. at 758 (emphasis added).
See also Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 A.D. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915).
44. Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933). The decision
represents a strict attitude towards fictionalization by the New York courts of this era,
since the film was substantially a documentary which employed actors for narration
purposes. Compare lower court opinion in 235 A.D. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 (1932).
45. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Calla-
han v. Israels, 140 Misc. 295, 250 N.Y.S. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Bridgwood v. Newspaper
PM, Inc., 194 Misc. 750, 87 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Brown v. Paramount Publix
Corp., 240 A.D. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544 (1934). In Corrigan, an action based on a roman A
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the initial period after Binns, then, remained relatively faithful
to the idea that at some point an individual's interest in the
accuracy of his portrayal becomes paramount. More often
than not, the emphasis in these cases, consistent with the stat-
ute, was on the commercial nature of the invasion.
Interpretations of the statute began to change only when the
courts recognized the serious potential impact on free speech
values. Thus courts perceived a need to undertake a more ade-
quate balancing of public and private interests. The focus
turned away from the theory of commercial exploitation to that
of realistic expectations of seclusion. Exemplificative is the
opinion in Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror,' a case involving an
unauthorized appropriation of a photograph to illustrate an un-
related piece of fiction. Justice Shientag noted that in drawing
the line defining "trade purposes," it was critically important to
maintain public access to information and news. He de-
manded that, in view of the overall function of a press in a free
democracy, a clear legislative policy be established before the
right of privacy was extended to cover news items and articles
of general public interest, whether they were educational or
merely informative."
In the succeeding years, the result of this concern was a
gradual obfuscation of the basic rule of Binns and an introduc-
tion of a series of tests whose eventual effect was to reduce
significantly the potential liability of purveyors of the type of
products Binns was designed to control. Although creative ex-
pression was thus given more leeway, it was at the expense of
affording the aggrieved individual a remedy." In a number of
clef about the New York court system, the noted maxim was voiced that "reputations
may not be traduced with impunity whether under the literary forms of a work of
fiction, or in jest." Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. at 65, 126 N.E. at 262. In
Broum the court found that a crime film purposely induced the belief that the charac-
ters and the plaintiffs family were one and the same. The requirement of reasonable
identification is, of course, paramount in these cases. See Silver, supra note 9, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. at 1076, 1084.
46. 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
47. Id. at 782, 295 N.Y.S. at 388.
48. From time to time courts and commentators have relied on various Supreme
Court decisions for the proposition that literary and artistic expression enjoy an ex-
alted status under the First Amendment. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1917),
where Justice Holmes argued for the necessity of viewing speech in its setting: "A
word is .. . the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in color and context accord-
ing to the time and circumstances in which it is used."
The constitutional protection of free expression vanishes on a showing that the ex-
pression falls into an unprotected category, e.g., libel, profanity, obscenity. The ques-
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notable decisions concerning alleged misappropriation of per-
sonality through novels, courts interpreted the New York stat-
ute as requiring full use of a name, contrary to the Binns
doctrine, effectively barring suits where similarity in names
and descriptive details made identification an easy task. In
this period, the Binns requirement of reasonable identification
was transformed into an effective defense. Instead of fictional-
ization providing a basis for a cause of action, it became a basis
for a defense.so
tion then becomes whether crass exploitation belongs in this unprotected group: "To
hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not fol-
low that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of
every kind at all times and all places." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502
(1952).
49. See note 41, supra.
50. In this respect, it is important to reiterate the differences between the identifi-
cation criteria for libel and privacy actions. An invasion of privacy, involving an un-
warranted exposure to the public, generally requires that a larger group make the
identification. Libel law requires only a limited communication and a much less wide-
spread identification if reputational injury is actually suffered. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652, Comment a with id. § 564, Comments b, d (1976). Actions
brought in New York under the libel rubric have therefore had somewhat more suc-
cess. See, e.g., Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 A.D. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544 (1934);
Callahan v. Israels, 140 Misc. 295, 250 N.Y.S. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Fetler v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966). In Callahan the court, despite a strong dissimi-
larity in names between the plaintiff Callahan and the fictional Ralph Halloran, found
a good cause of action in the total presentation: "The background was made up of
many allusions, not in and of themselves libelous, to incidents, circumstances, and
facts in the life and associates of plaintiff and his wife. In the foreground was set forth
the libelous statements . . .. The combination . .. was the evil accomplished." Calla-
han v. Israels, 140 Misc. at 297, 250 N.Y.S. at 471. The Fetler court pointed out the nar-
rower context of libel: "It is not necessary that all the world understand the libel; it is
sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant."
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d at 651 (emphasis added).
See Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 55 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. Mass. 1944) ("The real
question in this case is whether or not a considerable and respectable class in the
communities where the defendant's picture was shown would identify the character as
these two plaintiffs."). See also Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publ. Co., 413 F.2d 141, 142 (4th
Cir. 1969).
Privacy actions for fictionalization outside of New York have generally sided with
the more restrictive cases on the issue of identification. See, e.g., Bernstein v. NBC, 129
F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955) (docu-drama based substantially on plaintiffs past involve-
ment in a crime. No identification found despite wide publicity, and similarity of de-
tails); Wheeler v. Dell Publ. Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962) (most characters-except
the plaintiff-found identifiable in the film Anatomy ofa Murder).
Recent cases have reaffirmed the proposition that liability under the New York stat-
ute attaches where the representation is recognizable, regardless of use of names. See
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Groucho Marx Prod. v. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., No. 77-1782 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 30, 1977); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F.
Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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This approach is typified by the decision in Maggio v. Charles
Scribner's Sons," a statutory invasion of privacy suit brought
by Joseph Anthony Maggio, for his alleged portrayal as soldier
Angelo Maggio in James Jones's World War II novel, From Here
to Eternity. Despite the strong similarity in names, the court
reasoned that most readers would not look to identify the char-
acters, and even in that event, they would understand that the
author was drawing from his general experiences.5 2 "The end
result may be so fictional as to seem wholly imaginary, but the
acorn of fact is usually the progenitor of the oak, which when
full grown no longer has any resemblance to the acorn," the
court said. "Since a novel is not biography, the details of the
character's life and deeds usually have, beyond possible faint
outlines, no resemblance to the life and deeds of the actual per-
son known to the author.""
The Maggio rationale has some logic, in that there is a vast
difference between a work that purports to be the truth and
one that announces itself as fiction," a distinction the court
made between "biography" and "novels." In terms of the stat-
ute, the latter should not be considered commercial exploita-
tion of another since the character sprang solely from the mind
of the author. On another level, however, the argument is sim-
ply too facile. It divides all literary creations into two catego-
ries without recognizing that most works, particularly those
which capitalize on true stories, fall in between. Although
many readers may not have equated the character Maggio with
Jones's actual wartime acquaintance, it was generally known
that the author drew very closely from his own contacts. More-
over, where characters are based on famous individuals, not
only may the connection between fact and fiction be reason-
ably made, but the work may in fact derive power from the
strength of its suggestiveness.55 Thus modern artifacts of pop
51. 205 Misc. 818, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Magis. Ct. 1954).
52. Id. at 821, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Note, however, that for purposes of defamation, the "fact that the author or
producer states that his work is exclusively one of fiction and in no sense applicable to
living persons is not decisive if readers actually and reasonably understand other-
wise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564, Comment d (1977). In this light the
conclusion of the Maggio court that readers would not be likely to seek identifications
is highly questionable.
55. The flyer for the paperback edition of Topaz, Leon Uris's novel based on inter-
national espionage at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, is a typical example: "How
much of Topaz is fact disguised as fiction? How much did Uris learn about the under-
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culture such as The Greek Tycoon and Washington Behind
Closed Doors sell less on their own literary merits than on
their purported insights into the lives of Jacqueline Onassis
and President Nixon's inner circle.5 6 In this light, it is far from
reasonable to conclude, as did the Maggio court, that misap-
propriation through fictionalization occurred any less so than
in Binns.s?
The inherent fallacy in dismissing such work as a necessary
result of the creative process 58 becomes clear when reviewing
instances where New York courts, infected by the zeal to pro-
tect all forms of fictionalization, have applied the Maggio ra-
tionale to situations where a real name was intentionally
appropriated for supposed artistic effect. This rationale is con-
sistent with reinterpreting the statute along lines that would
better benefit the general public, but it totally ignores the com-
mercial exploitation at hand. University of Notre Dame Du Lac
v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp." is the classic case.
There the defendant producers concocted a surrealistic farce
cover events that shaped today's hot and cold wars? The clues are in the most provoc-
ative novel of the decade." L. URis, TOPAZ (1963).
56. When TIME reviewed the latter work, based loosely on the Watergate affair, it
made a direct equation between the characters and their real-life counterparts. For
example, a photograph of actor Jason Robards was counterposed to Richard Nixon's;
Robert Vaughn was compared to H.R. Haldeman; and Cliff Robertson to Richard
Helms. TIME, Sept. 19, 1977, at 93.
57. "[Tjruth is not their object; their principal concern here seems to be com-
merce. And the maxim embodied is not Picasso's ("Art is lies that tell the truth"), but
a much older and sleazier one: 'Fraud is lies purveyed as truth.'" Lukas, Bullets for
Breslin, MORE, June 1978, at 34.
58. Professor Silver in his most recent article offers what is, in this view, a weak
justification for such exploitation when he states, "If both popular and serious culture
sanction an inquisitiveness about public figures' private lives, then the scope of artistic
license must be delineated more broadly than it has been. Community standards have
always been relevant to a determination of precisely what is libelous. . . ." Silver,
supra note 9, 126 U. PA. L. REv. at 1082. Public interest, of course, has never justified
unwarranted intrusions or invasion of personal interests. Compare Warren and Bran-
deis, supra note 3, at 196:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effron-
tery. . . . The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civi-
lization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual.
(Emphasis added.)
59. 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, affd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d
832 (1965).
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about college football, 0 freely using without consent the
names of Notre Dame University and Father Hesburgh, its
president, as well as Notre Dame emblems. Although the court
did not cite Maggio, it employed the same theory, discounting
the blatant appropriation and asking instead whether a viewer
could reasonably equate the incidents in the film with life at
the Indiana campus. From this point of view the conclusion
was inevitable that "[n]obody is deceived. Nobody is con-
fused."6 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed without comment.
But Justice Burke, dissenting from the lower court, appropri-
ately noted that the majority had erroneously interjected prin-
ciples of unfair competition into a strict misappropriation
case.6 2 Under the privacy statute, the proper issue, Burke said,
was not whether the producers had deliberately implied that
the University had sponsored the project-a "passing off" situ-
ation-but whether a valuable right in name had been taken
without consent and remuneration. Noting the argument that
enforcing the New York statute in this case might chill lam-
poonery, satire, and other forms of entertainment, Burke nev-
ertheless maintained what had remained undisputed since
Binns-that private interests would prevail where commercial
aspects of a work dominate its purported public worth as a dis-
seminator of news or commentary.63 The crux was the recogni-
tion that exploitation of valuable names and symbols would
not be justified as literary criticism. As Burke stated, "the
facts of this case . .. do not serve as examples of opinion, in-
formation, education or comment about a real institution.
Rather, what is before the court is simply a fictional story with
the real name of an institution affixed to it and the symbols
60. Briefly, the plot of the movie in question, John Goldfarb, Please Come Home,
involved the plans of a mythical Arabian king to seek revenge on Notre Dame because
his son was denied a place on the football team. He forms his own squad whose star is
Goldfarb and blackmails the State Department into urging the college to send its play-
ers to his country. There, after being weakened by an all night feast, Notre Dame loses
an incredible game that ends with an oil gusher erupting on the field. 22 A.D.2d at 453-
54, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
61. Id. at 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305. See also Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publ. Co., 413
F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969).
62. Since Notre Dame's suit was partially based on N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 397 (Mc-
Kinney 1976), which extended the protection of the privacy statute to certain business
organizations, the suit in the majority view was in the nature of an infringement on
trademark. For a case similar to Notre Dame in the trademark area, see Girl Scouts of
America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
63. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 15
N.Y.2d at 952, 207 N.E.2d at 516, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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used in it for the sake of capitalizing on the publicity value and
reputation which the real institution has given those names
and symbols."64
The Notre Dame decision, despite its novel interpretation of
the New York statute, did not, however, herald a new, permis-
sive attitude towards dramatic license. Instead, for a time,
courts continued to be divided over the extent of fictionaliza-
tion necessary for a valid action. The subtest of reasonable
identification, as enunciated in Maggio, retained continuing
importance." The contextual approach of Notre Dame,
whereby the purpose as well as the fact of the actual appropri-
ation had to be examined and balanced against private inter-
ests, also remained relevant. More often, where real names
and personal histories were used in an embellished account,
the courts divided over the central issue, whether the work on
the whole was factual and protectible as a matter of public in-
terest or so distorted as to give rise, under the Binns doctrine,
to a statutory action.
In Molony v. Boy Comics Publisher's, Inc., a young man
whose heroic role in an air disaster was transformed into .a
comic book scenario found his suit dismissed because the
court found basic accuracy behind the colored panels." The
writer in Koussevitsky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc. likewise
escaped liability, the court finding that minor inaccuracies did
not transform the unauthorized biography of a famous conduc-
tor into a work of fiction.6 9 On the other hand, despite strong
public interest, the courts refused in a number of cases to dis-
miss actions against romance magazines that indulged in
fantasizing or excessive exaggeration when recounting obvi-
64. Id. at 953-54, 207 N.E.2d at 517-18, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43 (Burke, J., dissenting).
65. Recent cases include Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 58 A.D.2d 45, 395 N.Y.S.2d
205 (App. Div. 1977) (though the plaintiffs "character" was in the movie for 5 minutes
and the film announced the events had actually occurred, no liability was found); Wa-
ters v. Moore, 70 Misc. 2d 372, 334 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See also cases discussed
in note 50, supra.
66. See, e.g., Landau v. CBS, Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1972);
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Girl Scouts of the United States of
America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
67. 277 A.D. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950).
68. It should be noted that the court still applied the fiction-as-trade doctrine, but
merely found the form not fictional: "It does not follow that the plaintiffs exploit has
been fictionalized merely for the reason that it has been told through a form of picture-
writing, which is as old as the human race." Id. at 171, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 123. Compare
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 467, 178 N.Y.S. 752 (1919).
69. 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, afd, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
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ously newsworthy stories. 0 Similarly, in Youssoupoff v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. ,7 a television company was
found potentially liable when it made a historical drama based
on the assassination of the monk Rasputin that seriously mis-
represented the role of the plaintiff, who happened to be living
at the time of the broadcast.
This line of cases lends itself to no singular interpretation or
rule of law with respect to works of "pure fiction," where no
real names are used, or to accounts that remain predominantly
faithful to the facts. During the past decade, however, two
cases seem to have resolved the validity of the Binns approach,
as originally applied, in situations where a personal story was
deliberately distorted for apparent commercial purposes. The
cases, Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc. ,7 and the United States
Supreme Court decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill,73 indicate that
where blatant exploitation is present, the courts will look more
to the commercial interests protected by the statute and less to
balancing privacy values against the need for public informa-
tion. These decisions gave the courts a chance to settle the
constitutional questions raised by cases such as Maggio and
Notre Dame, at least in the context of fictionalized stories.74
70. See, e.g., Krieger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup.
Ct. 1938) (purely fictional article using plaintiffs name more than 100 times actionable
under the New York statute); Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 A.D. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233
(1950) (sketch accompanying speculative article was found "sensationalized ... be-
yond the scope of proper immunity"); Goldberg v. Ideal Publ. Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (fictionalized interview); Varnish v. Best Medium Publ. Corp., 405 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969) (ironic, sensationalized version of a
suicide-murder exceeded the public interest, hence actionable under Pennsylvania
common law privacy). See also Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). Contra, Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 226, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223
(1958) (indicating proper form for action is libel, not privacy; however, court found no
substantial fictionalization).
Cases in other jurisdictions involving detective magazines have reached opposite
conclusions. In each decision, contrary to the cases noted above, a critical finding was
the basic accuracy of the presentation. The cases are thus distinguishable. See, e.g.,
Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Tenn. 1968); Jenkins v.
Dell Publ. Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. La. 1962). See text accompanying note 150, infra.
71. 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
72. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), affd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
73. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
74. The argument favoring a wider application of Time, Inc. v. Hill to false light
privacy actions based on matters of public interest has been questioned in light of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See generally Pember & Teeter, Pri-
vacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L REV. 57 (1974); Comment, Tri-
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Spahn, while important in itself, also provides a wider frame-
work for analyzing the limits of the statutory approach, since
the Supreme Court relied on it for its construction of New York
law." As in Binns, the focus was on the deliberate commer-
cialization of another's story, this time in the form of a substan-
tially fictionalized children's "biography" of a famous baseball
pitcher." Since a publisher could not be prevented from dis-
seminating an essentially factual communication," the Appel-
late Division of the New York Supreme Court found it only
relevant to consider whether the public interest in the person-
ality created a special privilege. Reviewing the defendant's
contentions, the court recognized that as a public figure, Spahn
was not protected against invasion of privacy through accurate
items of news, literature, and even commentaries, despite the
profit-making nature of such enterprises." But the court de-
clined to adopt the proposition that dramatic license was so
critical to children's biographies as a genre that an independ-
ent right existed to distort an individual's private life and pub-
lic career without compensation. At stake were personal as
well as economic interests: "[Not] only a matter of price is in-
volved. It is true, as it ought to be, that a public figure is sub-
ject to being exposed in a factual biography, even one which
contains inadvertent or superficial inaccuracies. But surely, he
should not be exposed, without his control, to biographies not
limited substantially to the truth."" In short, by distinguishing
blatant misappropriation which invades economic and per-
sonal interests from essentially factual presentations, the court
found that the New York statute struck an adequate balance
between free speech and the right of an individual to the integ-
rity of his. identity.80
angulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development of the
Remedy in Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
543 (1976).
75. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1967).
76. "[It is conceded that use was made of imaginary incidents, manufactured dia-
logue and a manipulated chronology. . . . This liberty, for example, was exercised
with respect to plaintiffs childhood, his relationship with his father, the courtship of
his wife, important events during his marriage, and his military experience." Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 23 A.D.2d 216, 218, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 454 (1965).
77. See Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779,
af'd, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947). See note 41 supra.
78. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 A.D.2d at 218, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
79. Id. at 219, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
80. The appellate division decision was far more substantive than the brief affirm-
ance by Judge Keating in the Court of Appeals the next year. That decision, cited by
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In Time, Inc. v. Hill," the United States Supreme Court had
a clear opportunity to overrule the Spahn rationale in a consti-
tutional setting. Instead it focused on the extent of proof re-
quired to satisfy the test which determined a writer's
liability-substantial fictionalization.8 2 The Hill case, an ap-
peal from a decision relied on in Spahn,8 3 involved a Life mag-
azine article that depicted an upcoming Broadway melodrama
as a substantial re-creation of the ordeal suffered by the plain-
tiff and his family when, three years prior to the publication,
they had been held hostage in their country home by a band of
escaped convicts. Despite the newsworthiness of the topic, the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court found the
magazine liable under the statute. The article's patently false
description of the play as a re-enactment led, the court rea-
soned, to the "inescapable conclusion that this was done to ad-
vertise and attract further attention to the play, and to increase
the present and future magazine circulation as well." 84 The un-
derlying rule again was that deliberate falsity motivated by
commercial interest is not protectible speech.
Against the background of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"
where the standard of constitutional malice was established to
govern libel suits by public officials, the Supreme Court held
that the same quantum of proof-knowing or reckless falsity-
was essential to cases arising under the New York statute." In
so doing, the Court expanded constitutional safeguards into
the entire area of privacy, imposing them where stories con-
cerned any matter of public interest, not just actions of public
officials.8 The Court expressly refused, however, to rule the
the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, merely reiterated the rationale of the lower
court: "Thus it may be appropriate to say that the plaintiff here, Warren Spahn, is a
public personality and that, insofar as his professional career is involved, he is sub-
stantially without a right to privacy. That is not to say, however, that his 'personality'
may be fictionalized and that, as fictionalized, it may be exploited for the defendant's
commercial benefit through the medium of unauthorized biography." Spahn v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1966).
81. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
82. "Material and substantial falsification is the test. However, it is not clear
whether proof of knowledge of the falsity or that the article was prepared with reckless
disregard for truth is also required." 385 U.S. at 386-87.
83. Hill v. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 260
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965).
84. Id. at 487, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally note 1, supra.
86. 385 U.S. at 394.
87. In the area of defamation it is now settled that private citizens need only meet
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New York statute or the prevailing interpretation unconstitu-
tional, reiterating the long settled principle that calculated
falsehood" falls outside of First Amendment protections and is
subject to sanctions.8 Resting on this narrow ground, the deci-
sion essentially ratified the Binns approach to fictionalization
problems. Although publishers of essentially journalistic re-
ports such as the Life article can rightfully claim mere negli-
gence in making errors and thus escape liability under the
"actual malice" standard, substantial fictionalization as oc-
curred in Spahn will always qualify as calculated falsehood, al-
beit for purported artistic effect. That this indeed was the law
in New York became clear the following year when the Court
of Appeals, reconsidering Spahn in light of Hill, found that the
author's "all pervasive distortions, inaccuracies, invented dia-
logue, and the narration of happenings out of context"" fully
satisfied the constitutional requirement of knowing or reckless
disregard of the truth. In summary, the Court stated that, "to
hold that this research effort entitles the defendant to publish
the kind of knowing fictionalization presented here would
amount to granting a literary license which is not only unnec-
essary to the protection of free speech but destructive of the
individual's right ... to be free of commercial exploitation of
name and personality.""
Neither courts nor commentators have totally acquiesced in
this conclusion,9 2 and Hill continues to evoke criticism. The in-
a negligence test to collect damages, despite their involvement in matters of public
interest. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See articles cited in note 74
supra, for probable impact on privacy.
88. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
89. "The New York Court of Appeals, as the Spahn opinion demonstrates, has
been assiduous in construing the statute to avoid invasion of the constitutional protec-
tions of speech and press . . .. Any possible difference with us as to the thrust of the
constitutional command is narrowly limited in this case to the failure of the trial judge
to instruct the jury that a verdict of liability could be predicated only on a finding of
knowing or reckless falsity in the publication of the Life article." 385 U.S. at 397 (em-
phasis added).
90. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (1967).
91. Id. at 129, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
92. For a pre-Hill interpretation, see Silver, Privacy and the First Amendment, 34
FORDHAM L. REv. 553 (1966). Silver argued, somewhat anomalously, that despite its
glaring inaccuracies, the Spahn biography had protectible value as entertainment or as
a piece of historical romanticism that might aid the moral education of youth. Id. at
566. In his view, these hypothetical benefits outweighed private interests in accuracy
and freedom from exploitation. Conceding the difficulties of determining how much
fictionalization would then be permissible, he offered a test akin to the holding in
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937), whereby liabil-
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terpretations that have developed in response to these hold-
ings deserve some consideration here.
One aspect of the controversy has focused on the application
of the knowing and reckless disregard standard to an inten-
tionally fictionalized work. Justice Bergen described the crux
of the problem in his dissent in the final Spahn decision when
he noted, "all fiction is false in the literal sense that it is
imagined rather than actual. It is, of course, 'calculated' be-
cause the author knows he is writing fiction and not fact; and it
is more than a 'reckless' disregard for the truth . . . ." Pro-
fessor Silver and others have relied on this point to urge that a
new standard, if not some form of immunity, be applied in suits
against a creative writer.9 However, while there may be some
merit in that theory with respect to novels or romans A clef,
which rely on suggestion rather than explicit identification, a
rule of immunity, even if somewhat qualified, becomes un-
workable when applied to cases like Spahn where the equation
ity would accrue only where distortion was so gross that there was no substantial rela-
tion between the subject and the invented character. Id. at 567. This runs counter to
the more permissive view of the Notre Dame court; see note 59, supra. More impor-
tantly, the New York Court of Appeals had explicitly rejected protection based on such
speculative gains: "The free speech which is encouraged and essential to the opera-
tion of a healthy government is something quite different from an individual's attempt
to enjoin the publication of a fictitious biography of him. No public interest is served
by protecting the dissemination of the latter." Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d
at 329, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 880. For later criticism, see notes 94-97, infra.
93. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d at 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
94. In his latest article centering on defamation, Silver acknowledges that courts
have been too solicitous of private interests to allow unlimited license in the area of
creative biographies or wholly fanciful works which employ famous individuals as
symbolic figures. He suggests that existing common law concepts may be extended to
protect certain "valuable" works. See Silver, note 9 supra, 126 U. PA. L REV. at 1069,
1070. He implicitly concedes, however, that the task of separating the artistic from the
intentionally libelous may well be impossible. Id. at 1097. Professor Hill has proposed
a more concrete solution-imposing a substantially heavier burden on the plaintiff
than now exists to show a substantial part of the reader/viewership understood the
character portrayed to be the plaintiff. See Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the
First Amendment, 76 CoLum. L. REV. 1205, 1309, 1310 (1976). The rationale is that fiction
is "entitled to protection as fiction." Id. at 1308. This formulation causes an equal
number of problems. First, it ignores the integral differences in identification require-
ments for privacy and defamation. See note 50, supra. Secondly, it acknowledges in
effect that where distortion takes place in a commercialized biography, as in Youssou-
poff v. CBS, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1965), a connection by the
audience will inevitably be made, and that the plaintiff in such circumstances is enti-
tled to protection, regardless of his status as a public figure. Hill at 1309. See also
Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment: The Implications of Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 926, 942-43 (1967).
95. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publ. Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
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between a created character and the real individual is inten-
tional and complete. The New York statute as now interpreted
requires only a differentiation between substantial fictionaliza-
tion and minor inaccuracy.96 A rule protecting "creative" biog-
raphies would necessitate a further distinction between lazy or
malicious journalism and artful writing, and that is a hazy dis-
tinction at best. The result would most likely be a more arbi-
trary and subjective judgment of creative works than critics
claim now exists under the New York system. What standards
would guide a court in deciding whether a degree of falsity was
injected for aesthetic effect or merely to "fill the gaps," as in
Spahn?97 When Joe Esterhasz, one of the foremost practition-
ers of the new journalism, painted a grossly distorted picture of
an easily recognizable family living in the aftermath of a bridge
disaster, the Supreme Court declined to be drawn into such a
murky decision-making process. Instead, in Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co.,9 8 it found that regardless of his personal
designs, the writer was clearly reckless. In this light, the better
remedy appears to be the statutory proposal-the price of tak-
ing excessive liberties with the facts is consent or remunera-
tion.99
Another objection centers on damages. Professor Treece has
suggested that non-defamatory falsehood, as was present in
Spahn,oo should not give rise to liability since it inflicts no
96. "The factual reporting of newsworthy persons and events is in the public inter-
est and is protected. The fictitious is not. This is the heart of the [New York] cases
.... " Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d at 328, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
97. Professor Silver rests his theory on the highly allegorical novel by Robert
Coover, The Public Burning, a work that trades heavily on wide contempt for Richard
Nixon. Still, he admits, "The next author may choose to remain at ground or atmos-
phere level, rather than ascend to the realm reached by Robert Coover." Silver, supra
note 9, 126 U. PA. L. REV. at 1097. See generally T. WOLFE, THE NEW JOURNALISM (1972).
98. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
99. The Apellate Division in the Spahn case spelled out the equity of the solution:
"It may well be, as defendants urged,. . . that juvenile biography requires the fillip of
dramatization, imagined dialogue, manipulated chronologies, and fictionalization of
events. If so, the publication of juvenile biographies of living persons ... may only be
effected with the written consent of such persons. And if it also be true ... that such
persons use the consent as a lever for obtaining a price for it, then it is no more than
charging a price for taking liberties, otherwise unwarranted, with one's personal his-
tory." Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 A.D. 2d at 221, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
100. The trial court decision indicates that although the distortions did not neces-
sarily injure the plaintiffs reputation, they still subjected him to ridicule. Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d at 250, N.Y.S.2d at 531.
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harm.'o The only possible interest such an action could pro-
tect, he argues, is accuracy, but neither is the penalty commen-
surate with the harm nor do damages compensate the injury.
This argument is more conclusory than substantive, however.
It ignores the fact that distortion, whether libelous or not, can
cause severe mental distress or embarrassment, 10 2 although
this is not always evident in the cases Treece selects for his
theory. 0 3 Moreover, the interest in accuracy itself is an impor-
tant goal which the law of defamation already protects some-
what by imposing sanctions for reputational harm.10 Although
legitimate concerns have been expressed that false light pri-
vacy, which may impose liability for distorted yet potentially
truthful depictions, could "swallow up"05 the entire law of def-
amation, such a broad sweep is not suggested here. Under the
New York statute, liability is based on gross distortion through
fictionalization. Such a doctrine can in no way be considered
overbroad.
101. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histo-
ries, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637, 654 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Bernstein v. NBC, 129 F. Supp. 817, 833 (D.D.C. 1955) (court acknowl-
edged that harassment plaintiff alleged as a result of television drama based on his life
did occur, although no liability found); Molony v. Boy Comic Publishers, Inc., 277 A.D.
166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950) (plaintiff investigated and threatened with court martial for
violating Coast Guard rules against profiting on publicity); Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948) (portrayal of plaintiff by John Wayne tended to denigrate
him in the eyes of fellow professional naval officers); Maritote v. Desilu Productions,
Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965) (Duffy, J., concurring) (plaintiff and family ridiculed,
forced to move by wholly fictional series based on life of plaintiff's notorious father);
Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 50 A.D.2d 45, 395 N.Y.S.2d 205 (App. Div. 1977) (plaintiff
portrayed as "loquacious and unpleasant" and responsible in part for the bank robbery
committed by her husband).
103. The cases, Annerino v. Dell Publ. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958),
and Varnish v. Best Medium Publ. Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
987 (1969), are distinguishable from the cases in note 102, supra, in that the fictionaliza-
tion bore little or no causal relation to the harm caused by the publication. In Anner-
ino the fictionalization involved related to another participant in the crime narrated,
not to the plaintiff whose picture was used to illustrate the article. In Varnish the
fictionalization consisted of an omission which, if published, would have harmed the
plaintiff equally. In most cases in this area, truthful publication would have avoided
the harm alleged. In some instances, of course, the distortion may be so innocuous as
to 'cause no harm to the feelings. This does not settle the issue of awarding damages
for commercial interests in exploiting biography, however. See Cason v. Baskin, 159
Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635 (1947) (nominal damages awarded only, as no substantial injury
was found).
104. While acknowledging much fictionalization is intentional, Treece nevertheless
proposes that a mere requirement of correction is an adequate remedy. Treece, supra
note 104, at 659. Query: is this a realistic deterrent?
105. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 401; see also note 17, supra.
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Other criticisms have less basis under existing law. The fair
comment privilege, which grants conditional immunity to com-
mentary about public affairs,106 has generally only applied to
official conduct and in no case has been construed to protect
intentional falsehoods.'0 7  Moreover, where the defense has
been raised in cases involving exploitation of personality
through fictionalization'08 or misappropriation for commercial
trade use,109 it has been firmly rejected. Because fair comment
applies to matters of public interest, courts have found it par-
ticularly inapplicable to works that deal not with the facts but
with largely fictional circumstances. As has been noted by the
New York courts, the right to comment on aspects of a public
figure's life does not encompass the right to exploit his person-
ality through fictional distortion." 0
Similarly, it is difficult to construe substantial fictionalization
as protected opinion, as some observers have suggested."' Al-
106. The common law rule generally protects comments made in good faith. There-
fore the qualified privilege is lost on showing of ill will, spite, or knowing falsity. See
generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 606-610 (1976); W. PROSSER, TORTS, 791-
92 (1964). Since the retreat by the Supreme Court from its expansion of the constitu-
tional privilege, this lesser standard is likely to apply where non-public figures are in-
volved. It has been demonstrated that fictionalization tends to meet the more rigid
standard of knowing or reckless falsity. See notes 80-91 and accompanying text, supra.
107. Comments are not protectible if they are based on facts known by the defend-
ant to be false. Kapiloff v. Dunn, 270 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) (results of poll edited to produce finding of instability in a
presidential candidate). See also Maidman v. Jewish Publications, 54 Cal. 2d 643, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 617 (1960), where, under a common law standard, highly vituperative criticism
motivated by ill will was found actionable.
108. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prod. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., No. 77-1782
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977) (fair comment does not encompass semi-nude photo essay
employing actors made to resemble plaintiff).
109. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 284-285
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defense of newsworthiness inapplicable to sale of Elvis Presley
memorabilia in derogation of plaintiffs exclusive right to produce them). In both Fac-
tors and Marx, defendants relied unsuccessfully on Paulsen v. Personality Posters,
Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968), where a manufacturer marketed a
humorous poster of plaintiff, a comedian who ran an offbeat campaign for President.
The court found the use sufficiently newsworthy to deny relief. In Marx, the Court
found the Paulsen ration'ale did not apply to fictional distortion, while in Factors, no
similar newsworthiness was present. Moreover, the Factors court noted, Paulsen has
been limited to its facts. See also Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc.,
72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st
Dept. 1973) (impermissible infringement on right to exploit name and personality of
Howard Hughes).
110. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
111. Brief for Appellant, Bindrim v. Mitchell, Civ. No. 52133 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist.).
The appellant claimed that statements about conduct of plaintiff, contained in the ro-
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though certain defamatory words in a public debate may be
protected when used in an appropriate context,'12 this privilege
does not apply where the speaker implies the truth of his as-
sertion."'3 In most cases, it is the implication of truth that
makes fictionalized biographies attractive to readers or
moviegoers. Where, on the other hand, the author disclaims
any connection between his characters and real individuals,
similarities between the two make his motive as well as his
craft suspect as conscious exploitation. If he means to create
fiction, there should be no absolute right to appropriate an-
other's personality or life history to comment on matters which
are purportedly unrelated to the living character. Logically, the
writer should have to pay for the benefit if he takes so much of
the personality necessary for audience recognition in order to
boost the financial viability of the product."14
The New York statute was designed to inhibit serious intru-
sions into the integrity of one's identity and not to inhibit fair
exchange on matters of public importance. A writer is left with
the option of either paying closer attention to the facts or con-
ceiving a more artfully designed fictional world. Far from erad-
icating free speech, the securing of rights in the control of
biographical presentation, through introduction of a test which
hinges on the degree of fictionalization, results in a delicate
balance between the private interest in freedom from exploita-
tion and the public's right to information and entertainment.
The recent cases of Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,"' and Polakoff v. Har-
court Brace Jovanovich"6 have affirmed the validity of the doc-
man A clef, Touching, were mere opinion and not actionable as falsely stated facts. See
generally Silver, supra note 9, 125 U. PA. L. REv. at 1086.
112. The context that cloaks vituperative, even defamatory, statements in privilege
is generally a heated debate on important public issues. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coopera-
tive Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1969) (term "blackmail" clearly used in a hyper-
bolic sense at an open hearing); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) ("fascist"
protectible as an expressive idea); Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(description of a book as pornography is protectible when made by a literary critic).
113. "The legal effect of attacks on motives must be carefully distinguished ...
from accusations that an individual has committed a crime or is personally dishonest.
No First Amendment protection, of course, enfolds the latter charges." Gregory v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 604, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 646 (1976). See also Green-
belt Cooperative Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. at 13, 14, where the Supreme Court
noted that outside of the debate arena the offending term could well be actionable.
114. The extent to which one's personal history can be considered a property right
is another matter entirely and will be considered in the third section of this note.
115. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
116. 67 A.D. 871,48 N.Y.2d 606 (1979). Although a new trial was granted on the issue
of damages, see note 103 supra, an invasion of privacy claim was sustained where an
No. 3]1 513
trine, the former involving a preliminary injunction against a
derogatory illustration of the famous boxer, and the latter en-
tailing a statutory violation where a novelist depicted a living
attorney as connected with the underworld. While it may be
fruitful analytically, it is not necessary, as some have sug-
gested,117 to predicate recovery under the New York statute on
purely economic or personal grounds in order to establish a
more uniform statutory interpretation. The law at present pro-
tects the individual from two harms threatened by substan-
tially false histories-bruised feelings, which are compensated
through the award of damages, and threats to economic inter-
est that result from misappropriation of personality in a com-
mercial context. The broad scope of the doctrine secures the
remedy, but this is not to say that either a privacy or property
theory alone is insufficient for recovery. Other courts have fo-
cused separately on the personal and economic interests in-
volved. The difficulty has been expanding these theories to
meet the exigencies of the problem.
The California Cases: A Privacy Perspective
Since the protection of private feelings has been one of the
two main grounds for judicial interpretation of the New York
statute, the other one being economic, any narrowing of the
scope of these personal rights necessarily affects how a court
will view the issue of exploitation of personality through
fictionalized biographies. California's treatment of the right of
privacy exemplifies the resistance New York's broad approach
has met in other jurisdictions.'18
It is helpful first to note some of the reasons underlying the
difference in perspectives. California courts were never faced
with the kind of explicit commercial exploitation which the
attorney who had once represented a famous mobster was pictured in the novel, The
Algonquin Project, as part of an attempt to assassinate General George Patton.
117. See generally Gordon, supra note 15.
118. The reliance on privacy theory to judge fictionalization actions was reinforced
by the recent rejection of an innovative property approach. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). Cases taking a similar privacy
approach include Leopold v. Levinj 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970); Jenkins v. Dell
Publ. Co., 251 F.2d 447 (1958) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); Donahue v. Warner
Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954); Cordell v. Detec-
tive Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), affd, 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.
1969) (appropriate form of action is in libel, not appropriation branch of privacy). But
see Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
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New York courts encountered in Roberson. When they did fo-
cus on the privacy question, California courts instead showed
much more concern with the prevalent doctrine put forth by
Warren and Brandeis, the "right to be let alone."119 Here the
interests involved were not as clear as those of a misappropria-
tion case, where there is an obvious attempt to profit from an-
other person. Rather, concerns were focused on cases that
required a balancing of priorities, situations where private
facts were disclosed, persons were placed in "false light," or
someone intruded into an area of seclusion. It thus became
proper to consider not whether a certain taking of name and
likeness constituted an actionable misuse, but whether the
value of the information presented outweighed an interest in
seclusion. In this context the application of a privilege to pub-
lish, and not the abuse of it, became the center of judicial in-
quiry. The preference for speech over individual rights would,
it should be noted, invariably affect later inspections of prop-
erty rights in personality. 1 20
The shift in emphasis from the degree of exploitation to the
quantum of public interest is evident in Melvin v. Reid,12 ' the
first case to give privacy a halting introduction to California
common law. It concerned "The Red Kimono," a film based on
the life of Gabriella Darley, who had abandoned her life as a
prostitute eight years before the production and had been re-
habilitated into society. The producers, not content to use the
outline of her life as the basis for a screenplay, took whole inci-
dents from the public records and identified Darley as the cen-
tral character, both in the film and advertisements. 12 2
In the context of privacy law as it then stood, the court was
faced with a dilemma. Two of the primary tenets of the doc-
trine were that privacy rights could be waived by intentionally
submitting oneself to the public spotlight and that the individ-
ual's rights could be outweighed by legitimate public inter-
est. 123  Darley's story fit both these categories neatly.
Obviously respecting the principles of the law, the court never-
theless recognized an outrageous invasion and felt bound to
119. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 3, at 197.
120. These categories were developed, of course, much later, but are applicable to
the interests Warren and Brandeis intended to protect. See generally Prosser, supra
note 4.
121. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
122. Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93.
123. Id. at 290, 297 P. at 93. See generally discussion of cases in note 17, supra.
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provide a remedy. Since it was not tied to the strict letter of
privacy, California not yet having recognized it, the court im-
provised a solution. Looking to the state constitution's guaran-
tee of the right to pursue happiness,"' the court found that the
plaintiff's interest in her restored reputation and the state's in-
terest in the rehabilitation of criminals far outweighed the pub-
lic's right to know the true identity of the character in the film.
The transgression, then, had been committed not in exploiting
her personality but in invading her private life by coupling a
depiction with her real name.1 25 A balancing approach thus
came into being that far exceeded the scope of the protections
offered by conventional privacy rules. Even a public figure
could be guarded from "ruthless and needless" invasion if the
facts disclosed had been forgotten and important societal goals
were at stake.12 6
In its condemnation of the producer's commercial motive,
Melvin resembles Binns. For instance, the court specifically
decried the "expectation of private gain" as the sole excuse for
the film.127 Yet in Melvin, unlike the New York case, liability
did not hinge on the extent of commercialization or distortion.
Instead it was the disclosure of private facts that was critical.
Moreover, the court specifically rejected the theory that prop-
erty interests were invaded in the production of a fictionalized
biography.128  Although Binns and its progeny did not ex-
pressly recognize property interests, New York courts on the
whole were more explicit in acknowledging the economic side
124. "All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happi-
ness." CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 1.
125. 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93.
126. Most jurisdictions have eschewed consideration of the social value inherent in
the work, concentrating on newsworthiness instead. Thus, when the NEW YORKER
magazine exposed an obscure clerk as a former child prodigy, the Second Circuit held
that despite the lapse of time, the article remained a proper subject of public interest:
"[W]hen such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar
their expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day." Sidis v. F-R
Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). See generally Pember & Teeter, supra note
74, at 78-82. See also note 17, supra.
127. 112 Cal. App. at 292, 297 P. at 93.
128. The Court stated, "[T]he other causes of action of the complaint are based
upon a supposed property right in her name and in the incidents of her life. We have
found no authorities sustaining such a property right in the story of one's life. Appel-




Following Melvin, California courts continued to look to a va-
riety of factors, including the extent of the injury, the degree of
public interest, the purpose served, and the medium of expres-
sion employed. 3 0  The emphasis, however, remained on the
public right as the constitutional rationale disappeared and the
courts moved to adopt the privacy doctrine.1 3 ' Although a fed-
eral court interpreting state law in Mau v. Rio Grandel32 recog-
nized a cause of action for damages stemming from a
dramatization of a crime in which the plaintiff had been a vic-
tim a year prior to broadcast, the grounds for recovery were not
on any theory of misappropriation of personality. As in Mel-
vin, the court protected an interest in seclusion.13
Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp. 134 was the first California
case to deal substantially with the issue of fictionalization of
personal history, something only touched on in Melvin.'35 In
Stryker the plaintiff complained that the characterization of
him as "Sergeant Stryker" in the popular film, The Sands of
Iwo Jima, had invaded his privacy, both through its fictional-
ization and through representation of his actual deeds during
129. See, e.g., the Court of Appeals decision in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23
A.D.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965).
130. Gill v. Curtiss Publ. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 278-279, 239 P.2d 630, 633-34 (1952).
131. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) was the first case to
interpret Califronia law as recognizing the right. The court relied on the decision in
Melvin, strangely, since that decision did not adopt the privacy doctrine. In Kerby v.
Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942), the right was finally brought
into the state common law. Again, the court assumed that Melvin had already made
the transition, at least implicitly. Id. at 210, 127 P.2d at 578.
132. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939). The plaintiff, a chauffeur, became distressed
when a radio program revealed his name in the reenactment of the holdup in which he
had been involved. Since personal feelings had clearly been harmed, the court found,
"it follows that the plaintiffs right to be let alone, has been violated . . ." (emphasis
added). Id. at 847.
133. See also Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949) (boxer who
publicly adopted the name "Canvassback Cohen" couldn't complain of privacy inva-
sion when comedian Groucho Marx made light of him in a routine); Kerby v. Hal
Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942), where advertisers, using plain-
tiff's name in a risque film advertisement, were held liable for "pluck [ing her] from her
regular routine of life and thrust[ing her] before the world. . . ." Id. at 210, 127 P.2d at
578. Note, however, that imposing liability in circumstances where choice of name is
inadvertent may well violate present constitutional standards. See note 19, supra.
134. 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
135. In Melvin the court recognized the formation of "a plot," but did not elaborate
on the significance of that act. 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93. Compare the holding in
Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913), which interpreted
this process as the first step in misappropriation.
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the invasion. 3 6 Using the Melvin balancing approach, the
court found that as a soldier, Stryker was in part a public figure
whose heroics were legitimately in the public arena. 37  As a
result, it rejected the suggestion that "mere use of his name
along with a re-enactment of part of his life history, in part real
and in part fictionalized for private gain, ipso facto, without
more, spells out an invasion of his right of privacy."" While
acknowledging the commercial motive, the court still required
what had made Melvin actionable, a showing of "unwarranted
intrusion."' Thus the common law criteria of the disclosure,
in terms of the nature and character of the facts revealed, was
substituted in the fictionalization equation for New York's in-
quiry into the degree or amount of distortion. Whether the
portrayal in Stryker provided this new element was not deter-
mined, however, because the plaintiff in his pleading failed to
distinguish those parts allegedly fabricated from the accurate
content. 40 Some possibility remained, therefore, that under
this conventional privacy approach some types of distortion
through fictionalization might be actionable under a false light
theory.' 4 ' Yet the limits on that alternative soon became ap-
parent.
Smith v. National Broadcasting Co." made it evident that
mere use of a script and actors in place of documentary footage
would not constitute actionable distortion if the dramatization,
136. 108 Cal. App. 2d at 193, 238 P.2d at 671. The plaintiff seemed primarily to rely on
a misappropriation theory akin to New York's, although this is not entirely clear from
the decision.
137. Compare Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948), where in a defa-
mation suit, the court said of the plaintiff war hero, "[CI ommander Kelly agreed to
sacrifice for the nation's good his privacy, as he would have sacrificed his life. But he
was never asked to and never agreed to sacrifice his reputation [through the film based
on his exploits] as a 'chevalier sans peur et sans reproche.'" Id. at 489; Maggio v.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 823, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514, 520 (1954): "The complain-
ant [a soldier allegedly depicted in a novel] was not a public or well known personal-
ity, but like most of us, an obscure member of society."
138. 108 Cal. App. 2d at 193, 238 P.2d at 671.
139. Id. at 197, 238 P.2d at 673.
140. "The question at issue is not primarily one of the law of privacy ... but rather
one of the law of pleading." Id. at 192, 238 P.2d at 671.
141. Many courts have required that the intrusion exceed "the limits of decency."
See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953). In view of the
overlapping of false light and defamation theories, California has recently required
pleading and proof of actual malice and compliance with CAL. CIv. CODE § 48(a) in
such privacy actions. Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969). The
result has been to restrict severely false light as a broader alternative to defamation.
142. 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
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despite invented dialogue, was essentially truthful.1 4 3 More-
over, the court in that case, which involved a reenactment of a
ten-month-old crime in the Dragnet television series, sug-
gested in strongly worded dicta that a creative reproduction of
an event of public interest could never be actionable, no matter
how embellished. As the court stated, "[iut is a characteristic
of every era, no less than of our contemporary world, that
events which have caught the popular imagination or incidents
which have aroused the public interest, have been frequently
revivified long after their occurrence in the literature, journal-
ism, or other media of communication of a later day. These
events, being embedded in the communal history, are proper
material for such recounting."1 4 Smith dealt with a factual
dramatization of the public aspects of a crime without using a
real name and is thus distinguishable from other cases where
public and private aspects of a personal story have been
fictionalized.1 4 s Nevertheless the dictum does represent the
importance which most courts outside of New York have at-
tributed to such entertainment. 14 6
Cases stemming from detective and fan magazine articles
exemplify the effect of this theory. Under New York law and in
several other jurisdictions, courts were prone to make gross
distortion in such magazines actionable on grounds that this
type of falsification served no legitimate interest.1 4 7 Typical of
this line of decisions is Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,"4s
where a publisher was found liable for a highly fanciful "recon-
struction" of a crime in which a famous racing car driver had
been involved. The court specifically declined to rule the story
nonactionable on grounds that it was informational and ex-
143. New York courts, as mentioned, found strong evidence of distortion in any use
of a screenplay. See generally text accompanying notes 43-44, supra. Compare partic-
ularly Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 715 (1933). The complaint
in Smith may have succeeded on more specific pleading, however. As the court noted,
"There is no allegation that any fictional embellishments were added to the incident."
138 Cal. App. 2d at 813, 292 P.2d at 603.
144. Id. at 814, 292 P.2d at 604.
145. The absence of an explicit identification of the plaintiff made the case distin-
guishable from Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), which also involved
the reenactment of a crime. More importantly, under the balancing approach, the
court still found great current news value in the three-month-old story in addition to a
lack of compelling interest, such as rehabilitation, to protect. Smith v. NBC, 138 Cal.
App. 2d at 813-14, 292 P.2d at 604.
146. See, e.g., cases cited at note 118, supra.
147. See cases cited at note 70, supra.
148. 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
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cited public interest. Rather, the court found, "to the extent
that the defendant indulged in fictionalization, the inference
gathers strength that the dominant characteristic of the story
was not genuine information but fictional readability condu-
cive to increased circulation for the magazine . . . . [T]he pub-
lished story was in essence not a vehicle of information but
rather a device to facilitate commercial exploitation.""'s
When the identical issues were raised in California, by con-
trast, the courts were much more impressed by the popularity
of the product than by the manifest invasion of personality. In
Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,' the attitude of "that's
entertainment" was applied in the extreme. The plaintiff was
featured in a fan magazine article recounting in highly sensa-
tional fashion his brief childhood affairs with the girl who later
became movie star Janet Leigh.' He sued for defamation, in-
trusion upon seclusion, and false light invasion of privacy
through fictionalization. The court dismissed the defamation
count, seeing nothing injurious of reputation in the piece, since
"all the world loves a lover."' 5 2 Furthermore, with regard to the
privacy counts, the court held that Leigh's future success gave
the magazine broad license to exploit the private past of both
her and her friends. The rationale was that the public was not
merely entitled to publication dealing with current events; it
also had a legitimate interest in other media forms such as
books, radio, and television, which could inform and entertain
through the reproduction of past events, travelogues, and biog-
raphies.' Although the court added that the privilege may be
149. Id. at 545. This conclusion was not inconsistent with the principles of Sidis v.
F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), since the court found that a "fair news
account" of the incident fictionalized would have been protectible, though it had oc-
curred two years prior to the publication.
150. 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962).
151. The title of the article in question was "Janet Leigh's Own Story-I Was a
Child Bride at 14!" According to the court, it described the brief affair in coy, sugges-
tive language that implied the experience had almost left Leigh "frigid" and a "tramp."
Id. at 736, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
152. Id. at 739-40, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
153. Id. at 746, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414. The wording is quite similar to the analysis in
Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937), which offered
a solicitous interpretation of the New York statute: "Newspapers publish articles
which are neither strictly news items nor strictly fictional in character . . .. Such arti-
cles include, among others, travel stories, stories of distant places, tales of historic per-
sonages and events, the reproduction of items of past news, and surveys of social
conditions . . .. As a general rule, such cases are not within the purview of the stat-
ute." 295 N.Y.S. at 389.
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limited to some extent by an obligation to be accurate, the
writer was not restricted to "a cold recital of skeletal facts."154
Here on the basis of the Smith rule, it was stressed again that
fictionalization did not create a tort unless it could be deemed
outrageous in the sense of purporting to reveal highly offensive
or deeply private facts.5 5
Few cases in the privacy area have suggested a different
view, and those that have seem to have had little impact on
potential fictionalization actions. Interpreting the cases, a fed-
eral district court in Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co.15 1
ruled that a naval officer involved in an air crash who had been
portrayed in a television drama about the incident as wearing a
Hawaiian shirt, smoking a pipe, and praying, had the right for a
jury15 7 to determine if such distortions were offensive. 5 8 This
was more a loose interpretation than a refutation of existing
law, however. Dictum in Leavy v. Cooneyl5 9 contradicted the
assertion of the court in Carlisle, the Janet Leigh case, that
fictional re-creation of a newsworthy event was a protected
form of speech; yet the proposition that such ventures were
"purely commercial,"16 0 hence actionable, appears to have
154. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 748, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
155. "We do not believe that the imagination of the writer of the article as exercised
here creates a tort that would otherwise exist, and we call attention to the fact that
there are no 'so-called revelations of any intimate details which would tend to outrage
public decency."' Id.
156. The social value test, which balances potentially greater societal interests
against freedom of the press, has produced some disparate results. Compare Johnson
v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974) with
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971). Both cases
involved truthful disclosures of plaintiffs' involvement in past newsworthy incidents.
In Briscoe, however, the court, as in Melvin v. Reid, found a greater weight in the reha-
bilitative interest of the state.
157. 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
158. Although there is some dispute as to whether offensiveness is a question of law
or fact, in California it seems to be settled that unless the court finds the publication
incapable of such an interpretation, the jury should settle the issue. Gill v. Curtis
Publ. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 280, 239 P.2d 630, 635 (1952). In defamation cases court deci-
sions on the issue of actual malice have been favored at the preliminary stage to avoid
a chilling effect on the press. See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858
(5th Cir. 1970); Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581, A.F.T. v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438
(9th Cir. 1974).
159. 214 Cal. App. 2d 496, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1963). In this case, an attorney who had
appeared in defendant's film based on one of his trials sued for an injunction and dam-
ages when the defendant breached a contract limiting the distribution to television.
The court found a tortious invasion of privacy, partly on the ground of commercializa-
tion of plaintiffs role without his consent. Rendering an opinion similar to the New
York cases, the court rejected a defense based on newsworthiness.
160. Id. at 502, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
been an isolated instance of such an assertion. Moreover,
where misappropriation of name or likeness is in issue, the
California courts have followed basically the same privacy
formula, regarding the invasion as causing injury solely to per-
sonal feelings,'' not the pocketbook, and, like the Stryker
court, have balanced the intrusion against the public interest
in the product.16 2
California's interpretation has been persuasive in other ju-
risdictions as well,16 3 and its effect has been to relegate ex-
ploitation of personal history to the narrow confines of a
traditional privacy action. There it is constrained by the re-
quirement of considering the public interest and the necessity
of finding in the nature of the disclosure a "shocking" degree of
falsity for liability. While this may provide a proper solution in
regard to incidental use of names or facts from personal histo-
ries, the rationale does not adequately confront the problem of
deliberate manipulation of identity in large scale commercial
ventures such as present-day films. Both private and public
figures may have no legitimate means of preventing the disclo-
sure of much factual information about them; however, a more
balanced test would take into account valid interests in free-
dom from intentional distortion and exploitation. In recent
cases, it has been strongly suggested that the best way to en-
sure these rights is through recourse to a pure property the-
ory.'6 4 While some jurisdictions, including California, have
161. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82,
291 P.2d 194 (1955), where the manufacturer defendant in a widely circulated advertise-
ment listed the plaintiff as a satisfied user when, in fact, he had returned the machine.
Said the court, "The gist of the cause of action in a privacy case is . . . a direct wrong
. . . to the feelings without regard to any effect which the publication may have on the
property, business, pecuniary interest, or the standing of the individual in the commu-
nity." Id. at 86, 291 P.2d at 197.
162. Compare Gill v. Curtis Publ. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) with Gill v.
Hearst Publ. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953), where the California Supreme
Court, in cases involving the same facts, reached different conclusions on whether
there was a legitimate public interest in seeing a photograph of plaintiffs embracing in
public used as an illustration for a magazine article. The first court found an unneces-
sary intrusion while the later body, without overruling the earlier decision, thought the
plaintiffs had voluntarily waived their privacy. In his concurring opinion in Hearst,
Justice Carter was particularly sensitive to the effects of misappropriation by a com-
mercial medium: "By plaintiffs' doing what they did in view of a tiny fraction of the
public, does not mean that they consented to observation by the millions of readers in
defendant's magazine." 40 Cal. 2d at 232-33, 253 P.2d at 446 (Carter, J., concurring).
163. See cases cited at note 118, supra. Most of those cases, it should be noted,
involved special circumstances which may have weighed in the defense's favor.
164. Interview with Vincent Chieffo, of Rudin & Perlstein, in Beverly Hills, Califor-
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rejected this approach, the force of its logic still demands close
attention. 6 5
The Property Right
The idea that a life story can constitute a valuable, though
intangible, asset is not new. For years writers and film produ-
cers in particular have recognized the potentially enormous
value inherent in personal histories.'6 6 Large sums have been
paid to public figures and their families for the privilege of
transforming their lives into fictionalized biographies. Al-
though the payments have been viewed traditionally as consid-
eration for a waiver of privacy and defamation rights by the
persons who will be portrayed, 6 7 the contractual nature of the
arrangement has not obscured the profit motive nor the sug-
gestion that a significant property right is being bartered. In-
deed, the desirability of separating the personal aspects of the
privacy right from the economic interests of the individual
whose life is being exploited has a conceptual foundation in
common law'6" and statutory law, 6 9 as well as scholarly criti-
nia (Aug. 7, 1978). Mr. Chieffo recently argued unsuccessfully before the California
Supreme Court for a descendable property right in name and likeness stemming from
fictionalized treatment of personal history. The case involved a claim by the niece of
Rudolph Valentino based on a very loose television extrapolation of his life. Guig-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). See discus-
sion in text accompanying notes 236-38, infra. See generally Gordon, note 15, supra.
165. See general listing of film biographies in L. HALLIWELL, THE FILMGOER'S COM-
PANION (1974).
166. Albert DeSalvo, while incarcerated for the Boston slayings, was paid over
$18,000 for a release of all interests in any literary or biographical material concerning
his life, as well as for a waiver of tort claims. The arrangement nevertheless resulted
in a suit over the film The Boston Strangler. DeSalvo v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 742 (D. Mass. 1969). The wife of beat writer Neal Cassady recently
received more than $70,000 for her interest in the film about her husband. Turan, Three
on the Road, NEW WEST, Nov. 20, 1978, at 49.
In many cases it has been argued that for aspects of a personality to be valuable, the
personality has to be conscientiously exploited by that person during his lifetime.
This would result, in effect, in limiting the rewards of commercialization to the famous
who actively seek to market their identity through appearances and products. Some
courts have accepted this view. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.
Supp. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979).
167. Typical of early waivers was the license granted in Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948). See Gordon, note 15, supra at 607 n.219.
168. As noted by Prosser, the misappropriation branch of privacy necessarily con-
fronts an invasion of economic interest. "The interest protected is not so much a
mental as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of plaintiffs name and likeness as an
aspect of his identity." Prosser, supra note 4, at 406. Even courts which maintain that
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cism.170 As exemplified by California case law, privacy theory
is pregnant with barriers to fictionalization actions. Moreover,
there are obvious advantages to a pure property approach, par-
ticularly with respect to benefits for the next of kin,171 certainty
of damages,172 and a degree of theoretical neatness. 73 Never-
theless, to this date, courts continue to eschew recognition of a
proprietary interest in commercialized fictional biographies.
The reasons for this demand reexamination.
In many respects the problem of fictionalization under a
property theory has involved an interest in search of a defini-
tion. Under New York and California privacy law, the focus of
the inquiry is more clearly on how the method-intentional
distortion-affects the individual. Under a property analysis,
the question shifts to what the individual may own to the ex-
clusion of others. Too often that interest has been confused
with the mere control of facts. This is not the proper dispute,
however, since facts have always been in the public domain
the basis of the action is a wrong to personal feelings recognize this. See, e.g., Fairfield
v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 87, 291 P.2d 194, 196 (1955),
where the court stated, "It [an advertisement] was an unauthorized and unwarranted
appropriation of plaintiffs personality as a lawyer for pecuniary gain and profit."
169. A minority of jurisdictions in addition to New York provide a statutory remedy
for misappropriation. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216.1 (1950); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-405,
76-9-406 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1, 839.2 (1965). The Virginia and Utah
codes are framed in terms of unauthorized "use of name or likeness" rather than pri-
vacy, but are quite similar to New York's, supra note 28, except in terms of
descendability provisions. See discussion in text accompanying note 233, infra. Cali-
fornia has recently enacted a statute which by its terms is more clearly restricted to
govern the fields of advertising and merchandising alone. Instead of covering misap-
propriation for "purposes of trade," it is confined to use of name, photograph, or like-
ness "for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods, or services." CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 3344 (West 1976). Nevertheless the proprietary element is clear. See gen-
erally Comment, Commercial Appropriation of An Individual's Name, Photograph or
Likeness: A New Remedy for Californians, 3 PAC. LJ. 651 (1972). See also Lanham
Act, § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1502(c) (1970) (name trademark).
170. See Gordon, supra note 15; Nimmer, supra note 5; also Comment, The Right of
Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123 (1953). Both Gordon and Nimmer
point out the inadequacy of privacy theory as applied to appropriation for commercial
profit, since public exposure and embarrassment are not the harms suffered. A prop-
erty approach, they suggest, would be more realistic in establishing definitive rights
for the person exploited, and his family, as well as in providing a clearer standard for
damages-the value to the defendant rather than the harm to the plaintiff.
171. Property is descendable and may be assigned. See text accompanying notes
236-52, infra for problems in relation to application to life histories.
172. Damages could be readily ascertained since profits from an appropriation, the
value to the defendant, are accountable. In privacy actions, damages may be limited
by the emotional harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635
(1947).
173. See generally Nimmer, supra note 5, at 216-17.
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and are not transferable in a personal sense. What commer-
cializing of personal history through fiction does involve is the
broader question of exploiting the personality, of which per-
sonal history is one important component. When a writer ap-
propriates that history to mold his characters into recognizable
figures-and sometimes merely a name is sufficient-he is in a
very real sense trading on the identity of another to enhance
his own work. Consequently, in fictionalization, what is valua-
ble to the writer and properly classifiable as proprietary in na-
ture is the right to exploit the personality by using so much of
the background as is necessary to round out the fictional prod-
uct. Acknowledgment of the process may have some inhibiting
effect on the development of what are essentially commercial
projects, but it has the important result of granting a fuller pro-
tection to the personality.
The law has already moved in this direction to a significant
degree. Under various theories certain manifestations of per-
sonality have been shielded from exploitation through applica-
tion of a property concept. The right of publicity has been the
most recent innovation, establishing a property right in name
and likeness for purposes of advertising and merchandising.
For a longer period of time, actors, athletes, and other
showmen have been able to prevent reproduction of their acts
through enforcement of performance rights. Under the oldest
such doctrine, copyright, the benefit from other artistic produc-
tions has been reserved for their creators, if only for a limited
period of time. In addition, privacy statutes such as New
York's inevitably contain a commercial component which de-
scribes the proprietary nature of certain forms of misappropri-
ation. Under each of these doctrines, substantial protection is
given to a pure economic stake in different aspects of the iden-
tity. By comparing them in relation to each other, it can be
seen how the analogous interest in personal history is deserv-
ing of the same treatment.
The recognition of a property right in name and likeness in
the area-of publicity has been an important step.17 4 For it is
174. See generally cases cited in Prosser, supra note 4, at 401-03. Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) applied perhaps the broadest
definition of "likeness" since the plaintiff was only identifiable through the distinctive
painting design on his car. Id. at 827. In Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir.
1962), a dismissal of a claim by a famous actor whose voice was imitated in a commer-
cial was reversed on unfair competition grounds. Although finding no "name or like-
ness" appropriated, the court held the use amounted to a "passing off" whereby
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beyond dispute that knowledgeable use of these facets of per-
sonality can go a long way towards enhancing the commercial
value of a product or merely attracting attention to it. People
smitten by aggressive archetypes will more likely buy certain
boots because Joe Namath professes to wear them. Similarly
the mere appendage of a famous name is a sufficient attention-
getter even if the relation to the product is not clear, for exam-
ple, Sam Ervin hawking American Express cards. As applied
to fictionalized biography, the process operates identically.
The embellished film version of a rock star's life will draw
more as the story of Buddy Holly than under a name to which
the public attaches less importance. '7 5  Conversely, while it
may be argued that the name itself may not be so valuable
where the facts of the story are more intriguing than the indi-
vidual portrayed, the commercial value will still be enhanced
by the audience's recognition that the characters are real. 76 ;
Despite some precedent to the contrary, 7 7 however, the proc-
ess by which the publicity right has expanded to approach en-
compassing even fictional works as a whole has been slow and
tortuous. Initially courts dealt with misappropriation of prop-
erty interests only with regard to commercial endorsements
and advertising. This construction derived primarily from Hae-
lan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,78 the famous
demand for similar uses of plaintiffs identity might be lessened. Id. at 259. Where the
imitation was not of the plaintiffs identity, courts have found no such interference.
See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Sinatra v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (imitation of another's copyrighted
song which plaintiff had popularized). For a critique on how certain comedic rendi-
tions of copyrighted works may be enjoined as unfair appropriation of property, see
Nettervile, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commen-
tary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1962); Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 585 (1956).
175. See Flippo, The Buddy Holly Story: Friends Say the Movie's Not Cricket, RoLL-
ING STONE, Sept. 21, 1978, at 49.
176. Film advertising often deliberately accentuates this aspect to lend more weight
to the product. E.g., 1978 Academy Award nominee Midnight Express, which was pro-
moted as "The True Story of Billy Hayes"; an ad for Agatha, a totally fictional work
based on an incident in writer Agatha Christie's life: "What may have happened dur-
ing those 11 days is more suspenseful than anything she ever wrote." SAN FRANcIsCO
CHRONICLE-EXAMINER DATEBOOK, Feb. 26, 1979, at 2 (emphasis added).
177. Warren and Brandeis fashioned the right to privacy from a number of cases
recognizing various economic rights-in letters, artistic creations, and the like. 4
HARv. L. REv. at 193. The Supreme Court gave an expansive early definition: "A man's
name is his own property and he has a right to its use and enjoyment as he has any
other species of property." Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544 (1890). See
generally Gordon, supra note 15, at 553-60.
178. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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case that first distinguished the personal privacy tort from the
invasion of the publicity right, an impersonal economic inter-
est in name and likeness. Since privacy rights under the New
York statute were non-assignable,"'7 Judge Frank felt com-
pelled to design a new remedy in face of a suit by a bubble gum
manufacturer against a competitor for inducing a breach of
contract by a famous baseball player who had granted the
manufacturer exclusive rights to use his name and likeness in
promoting its products.8 0 Rejecting the defendant's conten-
tion that the contract represented merely a release from tort
liability, the court recognized a purely commercial interest in
identity that could be assigned in gross. Such a doctrine was
necessary to protect the economic rights of famous figures be-
cause, "it is of common knowledge that [these persons], far
from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of
their likenesses, would feel solely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, busses, trains,
and subways."' Thus defined, the right of publicity came to
be initially restricted to the field of merchandising, the same
area that gave rise to the traditional fourth branch of privacy,
misappropriation of name or likeness.' 8 2
As in Roberson,'s the Haelan court was reacting to an unau-
thorized use of a photograph on a marketable product. Many
of the cases adopting a similar property rationale, however,
have gone beyond this narrow scope to protect other aspects of
identity from misappropriation. That name and likeness are
equally valuable indicia of invasion of privacy was recognized
early on. In a California case that predated Haelan, a lower
court found that by virtue of his fame, a noted director had a
transferable property interest in his name alone.' 4 Similarly,
another early California case recognized that in certain cir-
179. Other state statutes have expressly provided for survivorship of the right in
relatives, heirs, or representatives. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-216.1 (1950) ("surviving con-
sort, or if none, his next of kin"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-405 (1953) ("heirs or personal
representatives"); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 839.1 (1965) ("surviving spouse, personal
representatives, or .. . a majority of the deceased's adult heirs").
180. 202 F.2d at 867.
181. Id. at 868.
182. The first privacy cases involved misappropriation for advertising use. Pasevich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 192, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
183. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
184. Mack Sennett v. Prosser, Civ. No. 54109 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., 1948).
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cumstances showing films taken in public of a well-known per-
sonality could be a form of commercial exploitation.185 Cases
relying on the New York "publicity" doctrine also moved to-
wards a fuller protection of identity. A federal court in Cepeda
v. Swift & Co.' 6 found, for instance, that a baseball player had
no justiciable claim arising from a merchandizing use of his
name because he had already been compensated fully for the
sale of property rights in his name, likeness, and signature.
More significantly, in Uhlaeder v. Henricksen,' the indication
was that personal history is inherently tied to the publicity
right. There a group of athletes sued to enjoin a game manu-
facturer from exploiting their names without compensation.
The court extended the proprietary interest far beyond name
and likeness to include substantive facts, as well as informa-
tion that was a necessary product of a distinguished career.
As the court stated, "A celebrity must be considered to have
invested 'his years of practice and competition in a public per-
sonality which eventually may reach marketable status. That
identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other
personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and a type of
property." 88
With this broadening of interpretation over what is protected
under the rubric of publicity, the law had also progressed be-
yond the early merchandising restriction to determine new ar-
eas where the right should be exercised. At present,
misappropriations of property interests may be recognized in
many other forms of communication, including books,'8 9
185. Douglas v. Disney, Civ. No. 664346 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., 1956). In this
case the court upheld a claim by actor Kirk Douglas after the defendant had televised
a. "home movie" type of film he had made of Douglas and his family while they were
visiting Disneyland. Because of the commercial value of Douglas's identity, the court
limited exploitation of the film to the consent given.
186. 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
187. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
188. Id. at 1282 (emphasis added). The critical conclusion that biographical mate-
rial was protectible as property derived in part from Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises,
Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967), where a group of golfers sued to enjoin dis-
semination of "profile" sheets the defendant distributed with a golf game. The court
found that the proprietary interest was not extinguished by the public availability of
the information: "(Alithough the publication of biographical data of a well known
public figure does not per se constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of the same data
for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commer-
cial product other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does." 232
A.2d at 460.
189. See, e.g., Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (1957) (famous golfer
allowed recovery for commercial value of name and photograph in instruction book).
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films,190 and magazines.' 9 ' In this respect it is difficult to ignore
the impact of the New York statute; for, since the Haelan deci-
sion, there has been a marked blurring of the distinction be-
tween what types of cases fall under the property and
statutory doctrines. 9 2 Theoretically there are sharp differ-
ences between the two, one protecting an assignable interest
and the other a purely personal right. As the law has devel-
oped, however, the commingling of aims is not surprising.
Rights under the New York statute become enforceable when
dramatization becomes commercialized "trade" use. The right
of publicity, with its protection against unauthorized appropri-
ation of pecuniary assets, encompasses essentially the same
values by protecting exploitation of name and likeness. Thus
the connection many courts have drawn is consistent with Hae-
lan's recognition that "whether [the action] be labelled a
'property right'-is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the
tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth."9 3 Thus, in cases involving
published works that might otherwise be deemed protectible
as purveyors of information, the property rationale has become
entrenched. In Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,' the fashion section of
a men's magazine superimposed Cary Grant's photograph on
the torso of a model displaying the latest wares. The district
court, interpreting New York law, was uncertain whether the
use was sufficiently newsworthy to constitute actionable com-
mercialization under the New York statute; still, it found a
claim had been stated under the right of publicity."9 s While the
magazine could in no way be considered a product and was in
some respects protectible as part of the media, the court con-
190. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mis-
appropriation of commercial film rights from survivors of original creators).
191. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court
also found a valid claim under the New York privacy statute for a cartoon-centerfold of
the plaintiff. Id. at 726.
192. See, e.g., Meyers v. United States Camera Publ. Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 765, 167
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (model's interest in dissemination of her picture encom-
passed property interest inherent and "inextricably woven" in her personality);
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144,
a.f'd as modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973); Rosenberg v. Lee's Carpet &
Furniture Warehouse Outlet, Inc., 80 Misc. 2d 479, 363 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1974). See
also Gordon, supra note 15, at 609 n.226.
193. 202 F.2d at 868. See also Prosser, supra note 4 at 406. See text accompanying
notes 37-43, supra.
194. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
195. Id. at 880.
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cluded that "if . .. impelled to trade upon the name and repu-
tation of a celebrity, it must pay the going rate."19 6
Reacting to the criticism that such a rule imposed undue re-
straint on First Amendment freedoms, the court referred to the
notable decision in Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd.19 7
There the plaintiff, a portable latrine installer, has been filmed
commenting about his duties during the making of a documen-
tary about the Woodstock music festival. He sought damages
under the New York statute on disovering that the entire two
minute conversation had been used as a comic counterpoint in
the full-length feature on the event. Although the news value
of the event was manifest, and the producers had not fictional-
ized the interview, the Third Circuit still found an actionable
misappropriation. The theory was based primarily on the dis-
tortion inherent in such a use-a kind of fictionalization
through overemphasis. "It would be one thing to photograph
Taggart as he went about his duties at a newsworthy event and
to include such a photograph in a factual description of the
event," the court reasoned, "but quite another thing to deliber-
ately draw him out in conversation for the purpose of making
him an inadvertent performer in a sequence intended to be ex-
ploited for its artistic effect."' 9 8 The finding that the project
was essentially motivated by "profit making commercial pur-
poses"199 was critical, and, as noted, has been attacked as su-
perficial.2 0 0 Nevertheless, it hearkens back to the established
dichotomy between protectible news and actionable trade
product appropriation established in Binns. Moreover, relying
on this rationale the Grant court found Taggart's message
clear- "The First Amendment does not absolve movie compa-
nies-or publishers-from the obligation of paying for their
help."2 0 1 Muhammad Ali, having similarly found himself
"drawn out" in a nude cartoon-like centerfold for Playgirl mag-
azine, was recently able to obtain an injunction on the same
principle-that his commercial property rights in identity were
protected under both the New York statute and the right of
196. Id. at 883.
197. 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973).
198. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 436.
200. E.g. Jenkins v. Dell Publ. Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958). See generally cases
cited at note 118, supra.
201. 367 F. Supp. at 884.
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publicity.2 0 2
Having thus established that ascertainable property values
exist in the use of name and likeness for commercial advertis-
ing as well as other forms of expression, it is important to rec-
ognize a second area where personality and property have
legally intertwined: performance rights.2 0 3 This is perhaps the
field where a famous individual's right to be compensated is
most clear, for in these cases it is not merely the name and
incidents which are exploited but also entire acts which may
be the conscious product of years of skill and effort. In this
respect, courts for a long time have not hesitated to draw lines
between what is justifiably open to the public and what should
remain in private control, although the rationale has varied
from protecting performances to joining the interest with the
right of publicity.204 For example, in Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp.,205 the court upheld an appropriation claim
by a boxer whose old fight films had been used in a television
sports special. Since he had sold the films to a movie company
before the invention of television, the plaintiff had no contrac-
tual remedy. Under a property concept, however, the court
202. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. at 728. See also Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (dual publicity and statu-
tory privacy rights with regard to a television advertisement that simulated a conduc-
tor's style and appearance).
203. The impetus to provide protection for performers stemmed from the require-
ments of the old Copyright Act that performances be embodied in a record or medium
that was reproducible. At first the controversy centered on appropriation of musical
performances. See Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phono-
graph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469 (1955); Waxman, Performance Rights in Sound
Recordings, 52 TEx. L. REV. 42 (1973); Comment, The Meaning of "Performance" Under
the Copyright Act, 7 U. ToL. L. REV. 705 (1976). In the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 102, 106 (1976), protection is extended to works of authorship "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression," including dramatic and choreographic works. Performance
rights are specifically reserved for productions so fixed. Where productions have not
been copyrighted, the common law has moved to provide additional protection against
those who attempt to appropriate another's work for their own profit. See cases cited
at note 204, infra. See also text accompanying notes 208-11, infra.
204. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (defendant enjoined from producing records
from tapes of plaintiffs opera performances); Capital Records, Inc. v. Greatest
Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (absence of copyright
does not prevent claim under state law for wrongful misappropriation of another's
work); CBS, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup.
Ct. 1964) (property right in newscaster's distinctive voice and style of speech); Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (absence of federal copyright does not preempt
state from requiring compensation for wholesale piracy of musical performances).
205. 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
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found that he should still be able to recover for exploitation of
his efforts: "The fact is that, if a performer performs for hire, a
curtailment, without consideration, of his right to control his
performance is a wrong to him. Such a wrong vitally affects his
livelihood, precisely as trade libel, for example, affects the
earnings of a corporation."2 0 6
More recently, employing the publicity rubric, a federal dis-
trict court in New York enforced similar rights against attacks
that their enforcement was precluded both by the public inter-
est and by the absence of federal copyright protection. In Price
v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,207 the court reasoned that states
were not prevented from protecting intangible property rights
outside the scope of federal statutes;208 moreover, these rights
existed whether or not the celebrities-Laurel and Hardy-had
chosen to reap their potential benefits during their lifetimes. 209
In the companion case of Price v. Worldvision Enterprises,
Inc.,210 the reach of performance rights was amply demon-
strated when a district court extended them to preclude re-
lease of a television series entitled "Stan and Ollie" that
consciously sought to capitalize on the actors through imper-
sonation of their performances, a distinct but volatile minority
view.
But while this conclusion was radical in itself 211 the
206. Id. at 486. See also Sharkey v. NBC, 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1938).
207. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
208. Id. at 846. The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's holding in Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), which explicitly stated that the general goal of
copyright law-to provide protection to authors for a limited time only-did not con-
flict with the state goal of preventing misappropriation. Id. at 559.
209. 400 F. Supp. at 846. See also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (failure to exploit fame does not negate the commercial value in iden-
tity).
210. 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
211. The essence of the Worldvision holding was that a publicity right in name and
likeness alone is sufficient to enjoin an entire creative work (as opposed to commercial
advertisement or product use) which actively employs the names of famous perform-
ers and mimics their acting styles, regardless of whether they are living. This obvi-
ously has enormous theoretical implications for cases based on a fictionalization claim,
because it implies that mere imitation and use of a real name are sufficient to state a
cause of action without alleging fictionalization at all. Under this extension, most
docu-dramas, re-creating the lives of famous persons, could be enjoined, even if highly
accurate or based on substantive research. More importantly, the right to bring such
an action was expressly made descendable, giving heirs the right to sue over such a
use. But see Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (publicity
rights not applied to fictionalized treatment of a deceased writer's life).
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Supreme Court has explicitly given performance rights an
even wider scope, recently applying them in a news context.
The case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,212 in-
volved an action against a television station by a unique per-
former, the "human cannonball," for broadcasting his entire
three-minute act without consent during a local news show.
Applying Ohio law, the Court rejected the theory that such
suits could be limited by the rules of privacy imposed by Time,
Inc. v. Hill.2 13 Rather than protecting an interest against intru-
sion, Justice White noted, the right of publicity guarded an eco-
nomic interest, in part to insure just compensation, and also to
encourage entertainment in general.2 14 In this way the right of
publicity was given much broader effect than in Roach, where
the Second Circuit specifically denied the applicability of copy-
right concepts such as publication and notice.2 15 In contrast,
the Supreme Court held in Zacchini that the "State's interest
is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law
. ... The Constitution no more prevents a State from requir-
ing respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his
act on television than it would privilege respondent to film and
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner . "216 The defendant argued that such re-
straints imposed intolerable limits on editorial discretion; how-
ever, the Court found that on balance, the individual's interest
required a remedy. Entertainment and news, endowed with
certain First Amendment protections, would not be restrained
if the performer were paid proper consideration.2 1 7
212. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
213. 385 U.S. 374 (1976). The Ohio Supreme Court had recognized petitioner's ex-
clusive interest in controlling the display and exploitation of his work, but neverthe-
less erroneously interjected the criterion of public interest in the process of measuring
the scope of that right. 433 U.S. at 562 n.4, 563 n.5.
214. Id. at 573-76.
215. 400 F. Supp. at 846.
216. 433 U.S. at 573, 575 (emphasis added).
217. The Court noted several cases that have roundly rejected First Amendment
attacks on federal copyright law: Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108
(N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v.
O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (1976).
In both cases derivative productions which satirized or implicitly criticized the copy-
right owner's original works were found infringements, although no exact copying was
performed. Disney involved an underground comic's pornographic rendition of the
plaintiffs cartoon figures, while in Stigwood the subject was a play castigating the
message of Jesus Christ, Superstar. The holdings tend to contradict the Court's asser-
tion that free use of "ideas or concepts" is not prohibited, and that the defendants in
Zacchini could freely divulge the facts concerning the plaintiffs act or even show
No. 3]1 533
COMM/ENT
The copyright analogy provides a final useful framework for
analyzing fictionalized biographies, for, as with Ettore's protec-
tion of performance rights,2 1 8 the law protects as property a
certain definable manifestation of personality. Some critics
have contended that copyright theories cannot be applied
properly to encompass a portrayal of historical incidents alone,
for there is no "work product" involved.2 1 9 In addition to com-
mercialization of personal history, they argue, a wholesale ap-
propriation of materials heretofore protected by common law
copyright is needed.2 2 0 Under this line of argument, a claim for
damages resulting from a dramatized version of the life of
Elvis Presley, for example, could not be maintained unless,
while drawing out the biography, the producers freely stole
songs and lyrics that could not be deemed abandoned to the
public domain. This theory was, in fact, the basis for Marvin
Worth v. Superior Films Corp.,221 where a district court en-
joined the distribution of a Lenny Bruce biography on grounds
that, without consent or payment, the defendant made sub-
stantial use of copyrighted materials, including various rou-
tines owned by a competitor who planned to release his own
film. 2 2 2 The defendants were not able to support their conten-
tion that most of their material derived from their close associ-
ation with Bruce, and, as a result, the court was able to find the
substantial "taking" and interference required for infringe-
ment.2 23 The critical distinction drawn was that biographies
about the famous could be suppressed if they made use of pro-
tected work without compensation, but otherwise they could
deal freely with the facts and incidents surrounding their
lives. 224
small portions of it as illustrations. 433 U.S. at 574-75. The underlying test is more
precisely predicated on the extent of misappropriation.
218. 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
219. Supplemental Reply in Support of Demurrer and Motion to Strike, Bruce v.
United Artists, Civ. No. C140-943 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., 1978). In the context of
parody, see Netterville, note 174, supra, at 252-260, where it is argued that courts should
distinguish between imitating a performance for entertainment purposes and appro-
priating the work itself for commercial use.
220. The Copyright Act of 1976 in effect abolished common law copyrights, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-301 (1976). As pointed out above, however, protection may still arise under a
misappropriation theory.
221. 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
222. Id. at 1270.
223. Id. at 1274.
224. "Here what is sought is not restriction of the dissemination of information
about Bruce, but a reasonable protection of his creative work." Id. at 1276. In reaching
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However, if we are to accept the cornerstone of this theory,
that a celebrity's work is protected as property despite First
Amendment interests, it is necessary to examine again the na-
ture of those other interests that have also acquired the prop-
erty label. Under the publicity doctrine, a name or photograph
alone becomes property when it is applied to an article of mer-
chandise or advertisement. Similarly, the appropriation of a
professional performance is deemed commercial exploitation
even though the event may be eminently historical and news-
worthy. On the one hand the name of the individual assumes
independent value; on the other, the individual's action apart
from the name is imbued with pecuniary worth. The law in ef-
fect has discerned a phantom distinction; for in reality the
value in both cases derives from the personality to which the
name and the act are integrally attached. Indeed, in publicity,
performance, and copyright, it is the personality that creates
the asset, and consequently the personality that is being ex-
this conclusion, the court necessarily determined that the appropriation was not a fair
use. The factors involved in such an inquiry are generally (1) the substantiality of the
taking; (2) the effect on the demand for the infringed property; (3) the public interest
in the information disseminated; and (4) reliance on other materials which resemble
the plaintiffs (i.e., other possible sources). In most infringement cases, courts have
protected the owner's claim despite strong arguments based on public interest. See,
e.g., Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (no discernible
public interest in the dissemination of a Rudolph Valentino movie sufficient to justify
infringement); Douglas Int'l Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (no interests protected in usurping
benefits of creative talent); see also note 217, supra.
In cases where courts have refused to apply copyright protection, there have been
extraordinarily compelling circumstances. In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1000 (1967), a case widely
cited for the proposition that with regard to biographical works, owner's rights must be
subordinated to public interest in the development of art and history, not only was the
degree of infringement minute, but in addition the plaintiffs had actively sought to
suppress any information of the material. Similar exceptions were made in Time, Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Ass'n., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where sketches of Kennedy
assassination film were protected in light of the need for widespread dissemination of
information, and in Meeropol v. Nizer, 361 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (publication of
letters by the Rosenbergs justified by continuing debate on controversy). But the
Meeropol case was later reversed on the fair use issue. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). If
the prevalent protectionist view were applied to property rights in personality, courts
would again have to weigh several factors, most significantly the degree of appropria-
tion and the presence, if any, of exigent circumstances. Once the pecuniary interest is
recognized, as in copyright, the owner's rights would most likely prevail. In this con-
text, then, use of "facts and incidents" concerning a personality in a commercialized
vehicle would be as significant as appropriating the work itself. Under the more equi-
table misappropriation doctrine, such a stringent analysis would not be required. See
text accompanying notes 202-10, supra.
ploited.2 25 The question then becomes whether that personal-
ity and the history surrounding it can be considered pecuniary
assets. Because of manifest First Amendment interests, the
law has recognized that certain verifiable facts cannot be con-
sidered property in themselves. It is for just this reason, how-
ever, that the recounting of personal history, in the classical
sense of biography, is valued: they have been basically factual,
with some leeway traditionally given for historical speculation.
Moreover, as the case law has demonstrated, some degree of
fictionalization is permissible both in a quantitative22 6 and
qualitative 22 sense. But First Amendment interests become
much less critical and the case for judicial line-drawing much
clearer when the writer is allowed to invade a personality by
appropriating so many of those facts, combined with other in-
dicia of identity, such as a name, in an intentionally distorted
work2 2 1 so designed for his own commercial benefit. As in
other cases where assets created by the personality have been
taken, the process results in a potent economic product, the
value of which should be shared among the exploiter and ex-
ploited alike. This, in effect, has been the philosophy underly-
ing the prevailing interpretation of the New York appropriation
statute, although it has been limited by inherent privacy con-
cepts. For where a court has balanced the public need for
dramatized biographies against the commercial content and
concludes that the economic exploitation is actionable, it is, in
effect, granting another type of copyright or property interest
in the biographical aspects of personality. In that limited but
definable context, the Supreme Court in Zacchini noted with
respect to performance rights that the First Amendment can-
not be used to sanction unconscionable misappropriation. The
225. Indeed, cases refer not so much to misappropriation of the product derived
from the personality as to the exploitation of the personality as a whole. E.g., Price v.
Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 846-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (independent right to have
one's personality, even if newsworthy, free from commercial exploitation at the hands
of another); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977) (rec-
ognizing the right of publicity gave "personal control over the commercial display and
exploitation of his personality and the exercise of his talents"); Spahn v. Julian Mess-
ner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 129, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836, 233 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1967) (right pro-
tected-"to be free of the commercial exploitation of his name and personality").
226. Liability under the New York statute is quantitative, predicated on the amount
of fictionalization. See text accompanying notes 35-43, supra.
227. California, in contrast, determines liability qualitatively, relying on the type of
fictionalization, on the nature and the character of the facts revealed. See notes 134-40
and accompanying text, supra.
228. See text accompanying notes 36-39, supra.
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public would not be denied entertainment as long as the pro-
ducer recognized the individual interest, contributing part of
his profits as compensation.2 2 9 Writers would still be left with a
variety of creative alternatives if they wished to avoid payment
of fees. Obviously, they could confine themselves to a histori-
cal, factual approach; however, it is likely the same desired ef-
fects could be achieved by extrapolating from the subject even
more, adding on another layer of fiction to distinguish the
fictional characters from their models. The result would be
that pure biographies and fictional works would continue to be
produced with impunity; only in the narrow area of docu-dra-
mas and other fictionalizations would proper consideration
have to be given to the subject of the work or his assignees.
Admittedly, no court has gone this far and recognized a pure
property interest in commercialized biography.230 The New
York courts, while examining cases under their statute, con-
tinue to temper their recognition of economic exploitation with
the application of privacy tenets.2 3 ' Similarly, the right of pub-
licity, while it has been applied in the context of books, news,
and television, has not yet been expanded to cover intentional
distortions of personal history. In California, the courts, while
recognizing that fictionalization can invade certain interests,
have uniformly declined to "blaze the trail to establish causes
of action based upon the right of publicity."2 32 Other jurisdic-
229. 433 U.S. at 575.
230. At this point it is worth noting that the recent Supreme Court decisions in the
area of commercial speech do not pose any significant barriers to legal regulation of
commercialized entertainment. Although the holding in Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), expressly
recognized some degree of protection for advertising and other "hard" commercial
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, it nevertheless stated that regu-
lation was certainly permissible to the extent of governing time, place, and manner, as
well as content. Id. at 771. In addition, because of its durability and verifiability, com-
mercial speech may be more severely restricted than other forms of communication. It
is subject to high standards of accuracy as well as prior restraint. Id. at 771 n.24.
Under this view, courts recognizing certain films as pure commercial products might
feel more compelled to impose limitations. See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
231. E.g., Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 58 A.D.2d 45, 395 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1977).
232. Strickler v. NBC, 167 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Cal. 1958). See also Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (1931) ("We have found no authorities sustaining
such a property right in the story of one's life"). In a more recent case, Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979), three justices joined
in Chief Justice Bird's concurrence rejecting a property approach to fictionalization.
This seems to leave plaintiffs with the option of pursuing recovery under the California
privacy approach. See discussion in text accompanying notes 236-38, infra.
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tions like Utah, armed with potentially more pliable misappro-
priation statutes,2 3 3  have also remained conservative in
approach, invoking property theory only in the merchandising
area.234 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service in a limited
context has cast doubt on the assessability of rights in ex-
ploitation of biography for tax purposes. 235
The hesitancy in adopting a property approach is obviously
traceable in part to the enormity of the task. Several concep-
tual leaps of faith must be accomplished. First, it would be
necessary to abandon the general restriction that publicity
rights apply merely to commercial products; alternately, films
would have to be recognized as commercial enterprises. 236
Second, property rights would then have to expand beyond
those indicia of identity which are already protected to per-
sonal history, the backbone of personality. Third, and perhaps
most critically, the restrictions imposed by the privacy doc-
trine would have to be discarded. Offensiveness of portrayal,
public interest in character, and voluntariness of exposure
would all be irrelevant in determining the boundaries of the
new right. Strictly interpreted, the property right would also
inherit the attributes of ownership, including assignability and
descendability. It is this last point which has proved to be the
greatest stumbling block to judicial innovation in this area.
233. See note 169, supra.
234. When it declined to find that a fictionalized film biography fell within the "for
purposes of trade" section of its statute, the Utah Supreme Court was faced with an
unusual claim by the descendants of the figure portrayed. Donahue v. Warner Bros.
Pictures Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954). But compare Donahue v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952), where in an earlier hearing of the
case, the Tenth Circuit essentially followed the New York rule that excessive fictional-
ization would constitute trade use.
235. Miller v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1962); Runyon v.
United States, 281 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1960). It is interesting to note that the reasoning in
both cases is somewhat illogical. In Miller, the contract for assignment in rights to
Glen Miller's story warranted that the wife was the "sole and exclusive owner" of the
rights conveyed. 299 F.2d at 707. Yet the court, recognizing that "something was in-
deed sold," construed it to be "the chance that a new theory of 'property' might be
advanced, and that a lawsuit predicated on it might be successful. It was a purchase,
so to speak, of freedom from fear." Id. at 710. In Runyon, where the issue was capital
gains treatment of sums received for the right to produce a film of plaintiffs father, the
court found no room for such sale treatment under the New York privacy statute, but
added that the taxpayer "had a property right in the name and story of his father's
life. . . ." 281 F.2d at 592.
236. The case of Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y.




The fear has been rampant that the passing on of such rights in
fictionalized biography would constrict too severely the tradi-
tional wide protection given creative interpretation of the lives
of deceased public figures.
Where the issue has been raised, four states have explicitly
relied on this rationale to bar suits by personal representatives
or kin for commercial appropriation of the life stories of the
deceased. In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,2 3 7
the most recent decision on property rights in personal history,
the California Supreme Court upheld a lower court order dis-
missing a claim by the sole heir of Rudolph Valentino stem-
ming from the film, Valentino, A Historical Fiction. The
plaintiff claimed that in fictionalizing the story, the film had in-
fringed on property rights which had descended solely to her.
In a terse opinion, the Court reasoned that because its decision
in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures238 had foreclosed a descendable
right of publicity, the plaintiff could not successfully argue for
a similar right passing to her. However, three justices joined
Chief Justice Bird's concurrence, detailing the reasons for the
rejection.
The gist of the concurrence, which assumed, contrary to Lu-
gosi, that the right of publicity is descendable, was that free
speech interests and traditional support for modes of expres-
sion such as historical novels made it inappropriate to extend
the right of publicity beyond collateral merchandising. As op-
posed to cases under the New York privacy statute, Chief Jus-
tice Bird argued that in the property area substantial
fictionalization was an ineffective test to distinguish actionable
intrusions from protectible speech, since publicity values
could be equally diluted by truthful publications. Another im-
portant aspect was the implication that property rights in iden-
tity should not be extended where there is no threat to
livelihood or invasion of a tangible work product, as in
Zacchini, the "human-cannonball" case.23 9 While support for
the concurrence is unclear, in effect the decision as a whole
reiterated the long standing principle that in California there
can be no cause of action for fictionalization without showing
harm to reputation or to an interest in seclusion.
Guglielmi enjoyed some support in precedent. Although a
237. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
238. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
239. 385 U.S. 374 (1976). See text accompanying notes 206-09, supra.
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descendability provision in its privacy statute would have per-
mitted it, the Utah Supreme Court in Donahue v. Warner
Brothers Pictures Distributing Corp. similarly refused to allow
a misappropriation claim concerning the biography of a fa-
mous entertainer. 24 0 The holding there, however, was predi-
cated on privacy, not economic interests.24 1 Commercial rights
were recognized by the dissenting judge in Maritote v. Desilu
Productions, Inc.,242 but the majority also refused to construe
Illinois privacy law as creating a right for Al Capone's son to
sue over a television series based on the mobster's exploits.2 4 3
The descendability issue also arose recently in Hicks v. Casa-
blanca Records" where a court was finally confronted with
the task of separating the personal and economic protections
provided by the New York statute.
At the center of the Hicks case was Agatha, a film consisting
of "conjecture, surmise, and fiction"245 about the strange disap-
pearance of mystery writer Agatha Christie during her early
years.2 4 6 The heirs and assignee of the author sought a prelimi-
nary injunction solely on the right of publicity, claiming their
inherited property rights in name and likeness had been
240. See note 179, supra.
241. The court, in examining a claim for statutory misappropriation by the widow
and daughters of the entertainer, grappled with the difficulty of determining how much
fiction would be required to bring a film under the "for purposes of trade" label before
deciding that "privacy, although of great value to individuals, does not contain the vital
social implications for the whole of society that exist in the allowance of freedom of
expression in motion pictures . . . and the like." 2 Utah 2d at 264, 272 P.2d at 183.
242. In viewing the extent of the invasion through wholly fictionalized episodes in
the Untouchables series, Judge Duffy agreed that Illinois privacy law at the time pro-
vided no remedy, but noted: "The defendants have been profiting, not from Al
Capone's life of crime, but from commercial exploitation ofpublicity values inherent in
his name, likeness, and personality . 345 F.2d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (Duffy, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
243. The reasoning was traditional: no invasion occurred since the plaintiffs were
not portrayed and any rights that may have accrued to Capone were purely personal.
Id. at 419. The result is in line with the decisions in two other cases where relatives of
famous personalities long deceased have based their actions on a pure privacy theory.
James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959) (life of son of Jesse
James); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (composer Robert
Schumann). Note, however, that in Schumann a property theory was also advanced.
For purposes of argument the court accepted it, yet dismissed the action because
plaintiffs had failed to allege facts showing the inheritance of it. Id. at 369.
244. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
245. Id. at 431.
246. "Mrs. Christie is portrayed as an emotionally unstable woman who ... en-
gages in a sinister plot to murder her husband's mistress, in an attempt to regain the
alienated affections of her husband." Id. at 429.
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abused. Interpreting New York law, the district court rendered
a narrow and unelaborated opinion. Justice Pierce implicitly
acknowledged that the right of publicity, in protecting eco-
nomic interests in name and likeness, and the statutory sanc-
tions against blatant commercial exploitation of personal
history through fictionalization served identical purposes. Yet
he avoided the question of whether a property right could be
applied uniformly to fictionalized portrayals. Instead, he found
that while the plaintiff had in fact inherited a descendable
property right in name and likeness stemming from the fiction-
alization, First Amendment interests in such works prohibited
the application of the theory in this case, where the work was
so distorted that "it is evident to the public that the events so
depicted are fictitious." 24 7 One of the shortcomings of the opin-
ion is the court's calculated reliance on the rationale of Notre
Dame, which has been distinguished as a deviation from the
course of New York statutory interpretation. As dissenting
Justice Burke noted there, if one accepts the existence of a
property interest, as Judge Pierce apparently did, the right to
exploit it necessarily overrides free speech interests. 2 48 Also,
the Spahn case, which had allowed recovery for fictionalization
but which the court distinguished as not based on a property
theory, did in fact rest primarily on the importance of protect-
ing the individual from commercial exploitation.2 4 9 /More im-
portantly, no standards were delineated to determine when a
film is too fictionalized to be actionable. Having accepted that
fictionalization could constitute misappropriation of property
values in some cases, the decision rested on the debatable
grounds of lack of audience identification between the real and
fictional. The implication, as a result, is that a more deceptive
247. The court employed a three-step analysis. First, it explicitly rejected any no-
tion that such a highly embellished work was protectible as biography, history, or fair
comment. Id. at 431. Next, it questioned whether, as in false light privacy cases, there
were any countervailing free speech interests which would weigh against application
of the property right. Id. The crux of the decision lay in the third step, involving a
distinction between the New York holdings in Notre Dame and Spahn. See text ac-
companying notes 59-79, supra. Because Agatha had not attempted to deceive the
public into believing the events as depicted, the court reasoned, there was no compel-
ling interest to protect. The defect of this conclusion is that it rests entirely on a false-
light privacy theory. The question of recognizing property interests was thereby cir-
cumvented, even though initially accepted.
248. See text accompanying notes 62-63, supra.
249. 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967).
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blend of fact and fiction might run afoul of a property right,
particularly if the individual portrayed is living.
A more profitable approach to the descendability issue is to
focus first on whether fictional biographies can be classified as
property before proceeding to an examination of the results of
such an application. The decision in Price v. Worldvision En-
terprises, Inc.,250 involving a claim by the widows of Laurel and
Hardy stemming from an imitative television series, did this
without examining the issue of fictionalization. As the case
shows, the descendability of the right in this way becomes a
secondary issue.25 1 Moreover, as the Hicks court itself noted,
although the law, at least with regard to the descendability of
the publicity doctrine, is far from settled, commentators and
the weight of recent authority suggest that publicity rights may
be passed on.252
This being so, a balancing test should only be used to deter-
mine whether the right should extend, not if it exists. Defend-
ants in these cases have argued that a multitude of injuries
would ensue, including a form of prior censorship, a chilling
effect on entertainment, and impossibility of establishing stan-
dards of review. 253 Nevertheless for years movie producers
have made contractual arrangements to secure similar rights
from authors of copyrighted works or individuals in the form of
"privacy" waivers.254 The price has been minute in comparison
with most modern-day budgets for films or book promotions.
The alternative would always exist, to produce documentary-
type works, where substantial leeway for inaccuracy already
exists or to extrapolate further and create a fully fictional ac-
count. On the other hand, a court could reasonably conclude,
as in Guglielmi, that the passing on of such intangible rights
might irrevocably damage artistic expression. This determina-
tion does not necessitate voiding recognition of property rights
for the living, who would stand to gain more equitable compen-
250. 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
251. See text accompanying note 210, supra.
252. Recent cases holding the right of publicity is transferable and descendable in-
clude Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Memphis Dev.
Corp. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). See also discussion of
Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) in note 211,
supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 229-30, supra.
254. See note 166, supra.
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sation than is presently available under privacy or defamation
actions.25 5 In sum, a theory based on property rights does pro-
vide a workable solution to the problem, although it is frought
with the difficulties of the present narrow interpretation.
Conclusion
The eagerness of writers and filmmakers to profit from the
notoriety of public figures through fictionalized biographies
has produced a serious confrontation between freedom of ex-
pression and the inherent right of the individual to be free
from excessive intrusion and commercial exploitation. So far
jurisdictions have varied widely in their approach to the con-
flict. Aside from defamation actions, which are limited by con-
stitutional rules, three basic doctrines have developed.
Under New York's generic privacy statute, an individual may
recover for personal harm suffered from a distorted biography
if the court finds excessive commercialization as evidenced by
the amount of fictionalization. This formula strikes a balance
between recognizing both the personal and economic aspects
of the injury and the public's right to varied sources of informa-
tion and entertainment. It is presently the most workable solu-
tion. However, problems remain in distinguishing accurate
depictions from fictionalized work and in granting at least
some recognition to the rights of heirs, assignees, or next of
kin, who are now ignored under statutory construction.
California cases are representative of the view that privacy
theory is controlling. This theory restricts claims for fictional-
ization by imposing strict common law requirements, including
offensiveness and lack of waiver. As a result, it is least suited
to an equitable solution. Only recently have courts examined
claims based on a distinct property right in controlling ex-
ploitation of personal history. Although courts so far have re-
fused to engage in the substantial widening of existing rights
in name, performance, and copyright that this approach would
require, the property theory has the advantage of clarity and
logic. Not only does it reward the individual for the inherent
economic value of his story, it is also commensurate with the
protections now given to other aspects of identity against mis-
appropriation. The question of descendability, presented in
255. Since relief would be measured by the value to the appropriator rather than
the harm to the plaintiff, damages would be readily ascertainable. See note 172, supra.
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the recent cases of Hicks v. Casablanca Records and Guglielmi
v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, should not cloud the issue of
whether a property right stemming from exploitation of per-
sonal history should be enforced for the living, as a balancing
test may be appropriately applied.25 6 Deciding when fictional-
ization is sufficient to require compensation would not make
courts, as some have suggested, any more literary arbiters than
they are now in deciding privacy and defamation actions.
Moreover, an incentive for accuracy would be created, one
much needed in a field where, under present law, dramatic li-
cense is being abused.
256. Based on copyright law policy, Chief Justice Bird in her dissent in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979), suggested extending the
right of publicity a lifetime plus fifty years but only as to misappropriation for mer-
chandising use. While in itself this solution would be an adequate compromise for
establishing property rights in personal history, it also suggests that sound policy anal-
ysis could produce equally adequate alternatives. Clearly, the task of judicial line
drawing is not insurmountable.
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